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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VICKI MOON, 
Appellant, 
-v-
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, in his 
official capacity as Director 
of the Office of Driver 
License Services of the 
State of Utah, and the OFFICE 
OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES 
of the State of Utah, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20323 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder presiding. 
The Third District Court judgment affirmed the Depart-
ment of Public Safety1s decision to suspend the appellant's 
driving privileges for 90 days (R. at 112). In accordance with 
Sections 41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20, both the agency and the trial 
court found that: 
1. The arresting officer had reasonable grounds to 
believe that the appellant was operating a vehicle while under 
the influence. 
2. The intoxilyzer test results indicated the appel-
lant's blood alcohol content (BAC) was .08% or greater (R. at 
110, and Hearing Decision). 
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The district court also found that: 
3. The documentary and testimonial evidence relied on 
by the department was sufficient to support the suspension (R. at 
3-4). 
STATEMENTS FACTS 
Vicki Moon was arrested for driving under the influence 
on July 29, 1984. The arresting officer. Trooper Craig Allred, 
testified at the administrative hearing that he initially pulled 
the appellant's car over because it made an abrupt lane change 
and was speeding, going faster than 80 miles per hour (T. at 4). 
After Trooper Allred stopped and approached the car, he 
noted the smell of an alcoholic beverage and, after asking her to 
step out of her car, he determined that Ms. Moon was the individ-
ual from whom the scent pervaded. Thus, the trooper requested 
Ms. Moon to voluntarily submit to some field sobriety tests (T. 
at 5) . 
Ms. Moonfs performance on the field sobriety tests was 
less than satisfactory. She had difficulty in performing every 
type of test which the trooper demonstrated and requested the 
appellant attempt. The first time the appellant attempted to 
recite the alphabet, she said, IfP, Q, W, S, T, U, M, Vn (T. at 
5). Although Ms. Moon testified that she thought she did fine on 
these tests (T. at 21), she miscounted her fingers on the finger 
count test, and even failed to touch her nose on the finger-to-
nose test (T. at 5-6). She could not coordinate thought and 
action together. The standing balance test and heel-to-toe 
showed that her balance was impaired (T. at 6). Additionally, 
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two .-! ot ** * *-. j ;mes she f a i l e d t o move her foot in time on the 
k € - 2 : i - :< h ) . 
Because of the appe l lan t ' s driving pattern,, the odor of 
alcohol about her and her unsat i s factory performance on the f i e l d 
sobr . -..-L-. it-; " "' oper A 11 i tnJ at i esteiJ Ms. Moon and requested 
that she submi* * .-: chemical t e s t . She consented and agreed to 
the t e s t , and v .. transported t o the South S a l t Lake Pol ice 
Department . . 
Trooper Allred, - c e r t i f i e d in tox i l yzer machine opera-
t o r, a 1 s o g a v e t h e 1 :t e c h e m i c a ] t e s t (T a 1: 8) T h € 
trooper t e s t i f i e d that he followed the operational c h e c k l i s t and 
that the machine v,a function properly* He a l so t e s t i f i e d 
t h a i he • *:. < . c • 
the t e s t 
The t e s t r e s u l t s indicated a blood a lcohol content 
(RACi o l . 1 pi.'i c e n t I T , dl Mi . 
Because the t e s t r e s u l t s indicated a BAG of .08% or 
greater , Ms. Moon was n o t i f i e d of the department's intent t o 
suspend her d r i v i n g p r i v i l e g e s and given no t i ce of her r i g h t t o 
an administrat ive pre-suspension hearing pursuant to Section 41-
2 - 1 9 . 6 , with her Notice of Intent, tu suspend. She made a t imely 
request for a hearing. 
At the hearing, documentary evidence was In t roduced 
incl11dinq tITe swrn ri DlII Repor f F*ir111» (in I 111 i»> 11 yzer Af f :i davi t 
and Intoxilyzer Checklist and Result. Additionally, Trooper 
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Allred testified and was cross-examined by counsel for the appel-
lant. Ms. Moon also had an opportunity to testify under oath, 
and did so. 
Based on the evidence received at the hearingf the 
department determined that the trooper had reason to believe that 
Ms. Moon was driving while under the influence and that the test 
results indicated a BAC of .08% or greater. The Department 
accordingly suspended her privilege to drive for 90 days. 
SUMMARY QEL ARGUMENT 
The arresting officer properly arrested the appellantf 
Vicki Moonf for driving under the influence of an intoxicating 
substance. Her driving pattern, the odor of alcohol about her 
person and her poor performance on the field sobriety tests gave 
him reasonable grounds, or probable cause, for the arrest. 
At the ensuing pre-suspension hearing, the Department 
of Public Safety properly received and considered the evidence 
presented, including the intoxilyzer test given by a certified 
operator. In particular, the department properly considered the 
intoxilyzer affidavit, showing the machine was functioning prop-
erly prior to the subject test. The affidavit was received in 
the ordinary course of business, regular on its face and showed 
all indicia of trustworthiness. A second Technician's Affidavit, 
showing that the machine was functioning properly after the 
subject test, was unnecessary. The intoxilyzer machine, under 
regulatory, statutory and case law, is presumed to function 
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p r o p e r l y for a 40-day p e r i o d , w i t h i n which the sub jec t t e s t was 
a d m i n i s t e r e d . 
The hea r ing was a l s o proper , in t h a t t h e r e was a con-
s t i t u t i o n a l combination of p r o s e c u t o r i a l and a d j u d i c a t o r y f a c t -
f i mil IT" w "il • ' i I h e h o a i i nqi o f f i c e r . I .:ii k e w i , ' . i e f I h o t i Wiiii n o 
p a r t i c u l a i ,: s p e c i f i c b i a s or b e n e f i t evidenced by the hea r ing 
o f f i c e r . 
by Sec t i ons 4 ,~2 - ib .o a•:*.. -*L-2K. Tne ore -suspens ion process 
minimizes t h e chance * erroneous depr ivat ior i :^ and i u b t -
deprivcil. i< . - ;J *.•• . . . r i s t r a -
t i v e e r r o r . 
Likewise, t he a p p e l l a n t ' s n y r o * • *• • 
been preserver? *h& made a choice and was t r e a t e d the same as 
-." : other Utcif; d r i v e r s . She r eceived a heard P , s imi la r t< those 
wno ie ius^ - ' i ; - ; "ham snhimf , I n J i In • •- . • * 1 
suf fe r * :.. : consequence (a one- year i cense i e v ^ . a t i u i •. ~ 
pared to a 90-day s u s p e n s i o n ) . The d i s t i n c t i o n s which e x i s t 
betweer • ?j>enM<iri oart * 1 i h 1 loo ,, umli ir Sod i oiu 4 1 ," • 1 HI , fi ,jnd 
20, and implied consen ..\i.-*. . under Sec t ion 4 1 "-6-4 4 ! 0, are 
r a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d t o l e g i t i m a t e government purpose of p u b l i c 
h e a l t h , safely aroil * , * g rea te i i l ep i r ' . a 4 , * ' " 'ed in 
r e f u s a l c a s e s , as ~- ^ + i- :^ck of chemical t e s t r e s u l t s , 
sugges t t h a t do review, r a t h e r than a review oi the adminis -
t r a t i ve i -ec< : > i '• I . , 'i t ef u s a l cas>. TM s o v e r a l l 
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s ta tu to ry system pro tec t s the due process and balances equal 
protec t ion r igh t s of both those who submit to a s c i e n t i f i c t e s t 
and the driver who refuses to submit to exculpating chemical 
breath t e s t s . The s t a t u t e s r a t i ona l l y provide d r ive r s with 
impetus t o submit to a s c i e n t i f i c t e s t . I t represents a r a t ion -
alp reasonable means of swiftly and e f f i c i en t ly removing hazard-
ous dr ivers from Utah 's highways. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INTOXILYZER MACHINE IS PRESUMED TO 
FUNCTION PROPERLY FOR FORTY DAYS. 
A notarized in toxi lyzer a f f idav i t was introduced a t 
a p p e l l a n t ' s pre-suspension hearing (T. a t 2, 4 ) . This document 
shows tha t r on Ju ly 25, 1984, four days prior to the a p p e l l a n t ' s 
a r r e s t and t e s t f the in toxi lyzer machine was checked and found to 
be functioning properly. Two "breath t e s t technicians '1 t e s t ed 
the machine and signed the in toxi lyzer a f f idav i t . 
Although t h i s document shows tha t the in toxi lyzer 
machine was working properly a mere four days prior to the appel-
l a n t ' s breath t e s t f no such document was presented a t the hearing 
to show tha t the machine was functioning properly af ter the 
a p p e l l a n t ' s t e s t . This r according to the appel lant , i s f a t a l to 
the suspension decis ion. Case law, however, c lea r ly indica tes 
otherwise. 
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Iii State v. Peterson, 674 P.2d 1251 (Wash. 1984) , a 
\J LIIUI lljil i'ar-e , tin* W :i SP h i nq1 -i Supreme C our t a c h l r e s s e d t h i s same 
i s s u e . The defendant had submit ted to a t e s t three days af ter 
the t e s t machine u* > uf^-\ checked and ca l ibrated f but no evidence 
was ill IliM machine WMI funrt ioninq . ji* ' -Y 
after the t e s t , \ ,* t:^ Washington Supreme Court ruled that such 
"bookending" was unnecessary. 
Regu] ati oi Is wI: I Ic 1: : , i:equi r e d 1: r e a t .1 i t e s t i n g m a c h i n e s t o 
be checked and ca l ibrated a t l e a s t once every three months were 
s i g n i f i c a n t *: the Peterson cour t ' s reasonin :«-- * d 
i. ^ - .• • ons e x i s t e d p r io r to the passage >i *- : ]7T 
law under which the defendant had been charged. Thus the Wash-
ington l e g i s l a t u r e wa^ .-> •• - :. * ^ 
t l o n s . Addit ional ly , .M . .ations went unchanged after pas-
sage of the new DUI law. ItL at; 12:53. These regulat ions thus 
a I 1 owt'M'l t h e I ' e t . i l i Q J l o u i i ! Mi i i i i i i l , l'ui t i n 1 pu i |x.)be ol i. I i in i fia I 
DUI p r o s e c u t i o n s , that the l e g i s l a t u r e had created a presumption 
that the b rea th t e s t machines would funct ion properly for three 
m o n t h s . I cL .it I! - » I , I'tHja1" * *' •• « ^i., I. II, ,, h . i.. had ln-en c h e c k e d 
wi th in three months prior t< the defendant Peterson's t e s t f the 
court upheld the convict ion 
As I he appeJIairl . - r&qn\ ,-r , one aniding 
the maintenance and ca l ibra t ion ot m t o x i l y z e r machines. See 
Appel lant ' s Briei ai Appendix 3 . These : . : requi re that 
a 1 1  3 i i tox i lyzer mar*..: . • checked at l e a s t once every 40 days . 
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Further, these same regulations and time period were in effect 
prior to the passage of Section 41-2-19,6, See Respondent's 
Brief a t Appendix 1. I t should, therefore f be presumed, as i t 
was in Peterson, jJL_, t ha t the l e g i s l a t u r e had knowledge of the 
40-day ca l i b r a t i on and check requirement in enacting Section 41-
2-19.6• Accordingly, in toxi lyzer machines are presumed t o be 
functioning properly for a 40-day period, or between 40-day 
checks. 
Necessity, as well as l og i c , d i c t a t e s these presump-
t i ons . A pre-suspension hearing, requested pursuant to Section 
41-2-19.6, must be given within 30 days of the a r r e s t . The 30-
day requirement f a c i l i t a t e s the s ta tu to ry purpose of quickly 
removing dangerous dr ivers from the road. I t a l so may help the 
driver by disposing of the matter quickly so tha t he or she may 
swiftly re-obtain the l i cense rather than continue to use the 
temporary permit. However, in many hearings such as t h i s one, a 
second, "bookend" breath t e s t machine a f f idav i t w i l l not be 
avai lable a t the time of the hearing. Thus, log ic and necessi ty 
also require tha t a presumption of accuracy be accorded t e s t s 
from machines checked within a 40-day period. 
In t h i s case, the t e s t machine was checked j u s t four 
days prior to the t e s t a t i s sue . I t was checked well within the 
40 days allowed by the regu la t ions . Because the machine was 
checked within t h i s 40-day period, i t i s presumed to have been 
functioning properly when the a p p e l l a n t ' s breath sample was 
- 8 -
t a k e n . S ince ti < , : : ^ ) x i l v ; ( . i ia.j.:4.m- i s presumed i ot f u n c t i o n -
ing in'opn; - . • * • r epa r tmcnt 
c o u l d r e l \ . <.». n/u l e s u l t s i r s u s p e n d i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s 
l i c e n s e . 
mim, ...n 
THE INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVIT WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
The i n t o x i l y z e r a f f i d a v i t was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d fo r two 
r e a s o n s }• * . :* document p r o b a b l y would be admissifa] e i n a 
c J : : . . . .
 r
 w p n
 "«
f
 *"h<=> document would no t be a d m i s -
s i b l e i a c r i m i n a l t r i a l , :* . i n h e r e n t t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s p e r m i t s 
i t s c o n s i d e r • : : .-( i - - |: rocee< I:i n g . 
F i r s t , the: • i n t o x i l y z e r a f f i d a v i t i t s e l f e v i d e n c e s 
t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s . The Depa r tmen t r e c e i v e s such a f f i d a v i t s t h r o u g h 
t .1 i e • ::> i:::: d i i la r } c: ou r se of bu s i ne s s , ';;, * • . .-^  , , i s r egu l a r 01 :i i t s 
f a c e . I t has been s i g n e d t w i c e by - t r a i n e d t r o o p e r s w i t h a 
d u t y t o do s o . Each t r o o p e r s i g n e d once under t h e words " b r e a t h 
t e s t t:< '; *~. - it id:.) "
 f in el i ca l.i mc] t licit, HIPV h/i< ,-e met t h e r e q u i r e -
m e n t s 01 b r e a t h t e s t t e c h n i c i a n s . Each t r o o p e i a l s o s i g n e d under 
t h e s t a t e m e n t : " I / w e , 01 1 oat .h, s t a t e t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g i s 
l.i ti f . T1 i i E • • :: a 11 I i i I c r e a se s 1: 1: I e i: e 1 i a b i 1 i 1 y o f 11: I e a f f i d a v i t , a s 
does the fact that the signatures were notarized. 
A ] J the above indicates that the intoxilyzer affidavit 
i- - - til: P and is a properly admissible business entry or 
official record, and received by the department as it would be in 
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a criminal trial. The above reasons are also what apparently led 
the district court to find that the evidentiary requirements for 
admissibility imposed by Murray City v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 
1983) and Section 41-6-44.5 and 44.3 been met (R. at 112). It is 
also a business entry admissible under Rule 803(6) or an official 
record admissible under Rule 803(8) of the formal Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
Howeverf even if the intoxilyzer affidavit would not be 
admissible in a criminal trialf its admission into evidence in 
the administrative proceeding was still proper. It has long been 
recognized that the rules of evidence "do not" strictly apply to 
administrative hearings like the one at issue here. Sandy State 
Bank v. Brimhallf 636 P.2d 481 (Utah 1981). Because the strict 
rules of evidence do not apply, the agency need not meet the 
formal foundational requirements of evidence presented in a 
criminal case such as Murray City v. HallF 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 
1983), but may use common sense and reasonableness. 
Murray City v. Hall, i&*_, and corresponding Section 41-
6-44.3f as cited by the appellant, relate only to criminal tri-
als. That is, Murray City v. Hall, jui^ r is a criminal DUI case. 
In that case, this Court discusses the requirements of Section 
41-6-44.3. This statute uses, exclusively, the term "judge" 
rather than, for instance, "agency" or "hearing officer", thus 
making it, likewise, inapplicable to administrative proceedings. 
Because Murray City v. Hall and Section 41-6-44.3 relate only to 
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c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s / they s e r v e mainly a s " g u i d e l i n e precedent" 
fo r t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of thi ,s i / i v . J , a clnii n i st i:a *, \w | 1 e-suwpem.i ' in 
h e a r i n g . 
As d i s c u s s e d above , the i n t o x i l y z e r a f f i d a v i t had every 
1
 . • a i v inch CM-
t i o n s . I t i s r e g u l a r i t s f a c e . 1: ' s i g n e d t w i c e by 
two t r o o p e r s — o n c e as "breath t e s t t e c h n i c i a n s " and once under an 
oa t! :i Th€ • • 3ocumei it i >ta i: i z ed. Because tl I e s t r I c t r ul e s 
of e v i d e n c e do not apply t- a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g s , such a s 
t h e o ne a t i s s u e h e r e , and be ca u se th e 11 it o x I ] ;; ? z e i: a f f I da^ > i t 
- *. • c L - ;.-* ..•; thi n e s s , i t was p r o p e r l y cons idered by the 
departmen :;: c o u r t , a s d id t h e cour t : be low, should a f f i r m 
the a f f i d a v i t s a d m i s s i on. 
POINT II I 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS ARE PROPER. 
Th*1 Btrittitf" iiiidr] which t h(j a ppt 'J l a i n ' \, i i c e u s i wdti 
suspended, S e c t i o n 4 J - 2 - 1 9 . 6 , r e q u i r e s t h e Department t o make 
on ly two f i n d i n g s in support of any s u s p e n s i o n d e c i s i o n . I t 
r e q u i r e s t h a i \\\w. Department I inci, I'll •. . • • t i n n 
o f f i c e r had reason t o b e l i e v e that th<» d r i v e r was o p e r a t i n g a 
v e h i c l e w h i l e under t h e i n f l u e n c e and, second, t h a t the chemical 
t e s t iresul ti s indie -• * a Bi \£ <: £ 08? or g r e a t e i .-*- - , > 1-
1 9 . 6 does not r e q u i r e t h e department t o make ti v sanu s t r i c t 
f o u n d a t i o n a l f i n d i n g s d i c t a t e d by a c r i m i n a l DLIJL t* 
Sec t i oi l 4] • 6 1 l ich bj def i ni t i on does not apj.1 i.^ c i v i l 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a r i n g s guided by a d i s t i n c t c i v i l s t a t u t e . 
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Because the department made its findings in accordance 
with the narrow and civil scope of Section 41-2-19.6, based on 
substantial and competent sworn testimony, the civil suspension 
of the appellant1s license should be upheld. 
POINT IV 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER HAD REASONABLE GROUNDS 
TO BELIEVE THAT THE APPELLANT WAS 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. 
The appellant1s driving pattern, her abrupt lane change 
and speeding in excess of 80 miles per hour (T. at 4) gave Troop-
er Allred grounds to stop the appellant. After the trooper 
stopped the appellant, the odor of alcohol he detected about her 
person certainly justified his request that she volunteer some 
field sobriety tests (T. at 5). Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968) . 
The trooper requested that the appellant perform five 
different field sobriety tests, aside from the nystagmas test (T. 
at 6, 15). Although each test was fixst demonstrated for her, 
the appellant had problems with each of these tests. The first 
time she misrecited the alphabet, saying, WP, Q, W, S, T, U, M, 
V" (T. at 5). On the second finger count test, she mixed up her 
fingers (T at 5-6). She swayed during the balance and heel-to-
toe tests, and had trouble touching her nose while performing the 
finger-to-nose test. She performed the key-drop test incorrectly 
two out of three times (T. at 6) . 
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Although Ms. Moon's performance of the f i e l d sobriety 
t e s t s was not t e r r i b l e , i t was cer ta in ly not s a t i s f a c t o r y . Her 
driving pattern, the smell of alcohol about her person, and the 
numerous problems she had in performing the f i e l d sobriety t e s t s 
gave Trooper All red, as both the department and the t r i a l court 
found, "grounds to be l i eve" that the appel lant was under the 
inf luence . 
POINT V 
UTAH'S DUI LAWS 
SATISFY DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES. 
The United S ta te s Supreme Court has sanctioned 
DUI/implied consent laws. In Mackey v. Montrymf 443 U.S. 1 
(1979), the Court upheld Massachusetts1 implied consent system 
under which the p e t i t i o n e r ' s driver l i c e n s e was revoked for 
refusing to take a breath t e s t . 
Under the Massachusetts system, the "registrar" summa-
r i l y revokes the d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e on rece ip t of a po l i ce o f f i -
c e r ' s report of that d r i v e r ' s refusal to submit to a chemical 
t e s t . Only after revocation has occurred i s the Massachusetts 
driver e n t i t l e d t o an administrat ive hearing. Id. at 2615. This 
post-suspension hearing i s s imilar to Utah's pre-suspension 
hearing in that i t covers a few narrow i s s u e s , namely: (1) 
whether or not the o f f i c er had reason to be l i eve the driver was 
operating a v e h i c l e w i l e under the inf luence; (2) whether or not 
the driver was arres ted; and (3) whether or not the driver re -
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fused to submit to a t e s t . Id. at F.N*5. After t h i s i n i t i a l 
hearing, which i s the post -depr ivat ion hearing, the Massachusetts 
driver may seek addi t ional adminis t ra t ive and j u d i c i a l review. 
JjdL a t 6-8. 
In analyzing the cons t i tu t iona l sufficiency of the 
Massachusetts1 system, the Montrym Court, following the Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), balancing t e s t , considered 
three f ac to r s . I t considered: (1) the pr iva te i n t e r e s t a t 
stake—the d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e ; (2) the r isk of erroneous depriva-
t i on , and value of a l t e rna t i ve procedural safeguards; and (3) the 
governmental i n t e r e s t a t s take . 
In considering the f i r s t of these three f ac to r s , the 
Court recognized tha t dr ivers do have an i n t e r e s t in t he i r l i -
censes. More spec i f i ca l ly , the Court found "the d r ive r 1 s i n t e r -
e s t i s in continued possession and use of h i s l icense pending the 
outcome of the hearing due him." XcL. a t 1 1 . The "hearing due 
him" in Montrym i s the adminis t ra t ive post -depr ivat ion hearing, 
the f i r s t hearing ava i l ab le to the Massachusetts driver af ter the 
summary revocation of h i s l i c ense . Because Utah d r i v e r s , l i k e 
the appel lant , are i n i t i a l l y afforded a pre-suspension hearing, 
the individual i n t e r e s t i s , accordingly, decreased. That i s , 
because under Section 41-2-19.6 the appellant had continued 
possession of her (temporary) l icense un t i l the "hearing due 
[he r ] " , her i n t e r e s t i s l e s s than t ha t of the Massachusetts 
d r ive r . 
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The Montrym court also unqualifiedly recognized the 
substantial governmental interestf the third factorf in promptly 
removing impaired and dangerous drivers from the road, and keep-
ing them off through an efficient administrative process* Id, at 
17-19. Indeed, the state1s interest is so strong that it led the 
Montrym court to find a pre-suspension hearing unnecessary. 
In discussion of the second leg of the Eldridge balanc-
ing test, the risk of erroneous deprivation, the Montrym court 
found that the flexible due process clause does not require a 
risk-free system. The Court stated: 
The Due Process Clause simply does not man-
date that all governmental decision making 
comply with standards that assure perfect, 
error-free determinations. Greenholtz V. 
Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra at 7. Thus, 
even though our legal tradition regards the 
adversary process as the best means of ascer-
taining truth and minimizing the risk of 
error, the "ordinary principle" established 
by our prior decisions is that "something 
less than an evidentiary hearing is suffi-
cient prior to adverse administrative ac-
tion." Dixon v. Love, supra at 113. And, 
when prompt pose-deprivation review is avail-
able for correction of administrative error, 
we have generally required no more than that 
the pre-deprivation procedures used be de-
signed to provide a reasonable reliable basis 
for concluding that the facts justifying the 
official action are as a responsible govern-
mental official warrants them to be. See, 
e.g. Barry v. Barchi, post, at 65-66; Mathews 
v, Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334. [JLd^  at 13.] 
Thus, in considering the second prong of the Eldridge 
test, the nature of the administrative suspension system should 
be examined, as should the nature of relief from or judicial 
review of an adverse agency decision. 
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A. The Utah System Minimizes the 
Chance of Erroneous Deprivation. 
As the Montrym court s ta ted , the Due Process Clause 
does not require an "e r ror - f ree" system. Andf so long as prompt 
j ud i c i a l review of the suspension decision i s avai l able , i t does 
not require an evidentiary hearing prior to the suspension of an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s driver l i c ense . 
In Utah, prompt j ud i c i a l re l ie f from an adverse suspen-
sion decision i s ava i lab le . Under Section 41-2-19.6, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953) as amended, dr ivers may f i l e or p e t i t i o n to the 
reviewing court within 3 0 days af ter the suspension. Not only i s 
r e l i e f prompt, but the chance tha t the l icense of a driver oper-
a t ing a vehic le with a BAC of l e s s than .08% wi l l be suspended i s 
very r a re . The r isk i s minimized by the police department check, 
public safety reviews of the record, an opportunity for a hear-
ing, and prompt review by the Court. 
Utah's adminis t ra t ive l icense suspension system pro-
t e c t s d r ive rs against the r isk of erroneous depr ivat ion. F i r s t , 
unlike the system a t issue in Montrym. in Utah a driver l icense 
i s not suspended u n t i l .aJLkfiX the dr iver has been afforded an 
opportunity for a hearing. Although the Const i tut ion does not 
require an evidentiary hearing prior to adverse adminis t ra t ive 
ac t ion , Montrym, iiL. a t 13, a t the hearing in issue evidence was 
taken. Documentary evidence was taken, and both the appel lant 
and the officer t e s t i f i e d . 
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The Montrym court found that the arres t ing o f f i c e r ' s 
wr i t t en report was r e l i a b l e enough to support a summary revoca-
t i o n . The court characterized the report as containing "objec-
t i v e f a c t s " . But those "object ive fac t s" of s i g n i f i c a n c e in 
Montrym are only those f a c t s within the personal knowledge of the 
arres t ing o f f i c e r , id*, a t 13 , 14. Characterizing the arres t ing 
o f f i cer as a "trained observer and inves t iga tor" , id . at 14 , the 
Montrym Court found i t easy to uphold the Massachusetts system 
which predicated l i c e n s e revocation on "object ive f a c t s e i ther 
wi th in the personal knowledge of an impartial government o f f i c i a l 
or readi ly ascerta inable by him." XdL at 13 . Likewise, the 
o f f i c e r ' s ob jec t ive testimony in t h i s case provides a "reasonably 
r e l i a b l e bas is" for the suspension which was based in part on 
ob jec t ive testimony. 
The risk of erroneous deprivat ion i s a l s o minimized 
through requiring the agency to address only r e l a t i v e l y simple 
i s s u e s . Sect ion 41-2-19 .6(5) narrowly only requires the depart-
ment to determine: (1) whether the arres t ing o f f i c er had reason-
able cause to b e l i e v e that the driver was operating a v e h i c l e 
under the in f luence; and (2) whether the d r i v e r ' s BAC t e s t re -
s u l t s , "if any", indicated a .08% BAC or greater . The DUI Report 
Form, Breathalyzer Operational Checklist and Results along with 
the o f f i c e r ' s and d r i v e r ' s t es t imonies permit ready determination 
of these two i s s u e s . 
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For these reasons, the r isk of erroneous deprivat ion 
under Utah's new DUI laws i s s l i g h t , and i t i s much l e s s , because 
the suspension i s based on an evident iary hearing ra ther than 
exclusively on an o f f i c e r ' s repor t , than tha t sanction in 
Montrym. This minimal r i sk , combined with the added safeguard of 
post -depr ivat ion j ud i c i a l review, make Utah's DUI suspension 
system cons t i t u t i ona l ly sound. 
B. Post-Deprivation Relief i s Signif icant 
and Const i tu t ional ly Suff ic ient . 
As previously mentioned, under the Massachusetts system 
a driver receives a hearing only af ter h i s or her l i cense has 
been summarily revoked by the r e g i s t r a r on rece ip t of a police 
repor t . This post-suspension hearing, adminis t ra t ive in form and 
the f i r s t ava i l ab le to the Massachusetts d r iver , i s the "prompt 
post -depr ivat ion re l i e f " the Montrym Court emphasizes. The Utah 
pre-suspension hearing mirrors the Massachusetts post -depr ivat ion 
hearing. Both are adminis t ra t ive and cover s imilar i s sues . The 
major difference i s , or course, the Utah d r i v e r ' s l i cense i s not 
suspended, if a t a l l , u n t i l .afJLjei. the hearing. In Massachusetts, 
the l icense wi l l have been summarily revoked pr ior to the hear-
ing . 
Because the post -depr ivat ion of s ignif icance in Montrym 
i s adminis t ra t ive in nature , appropriate standards of j u d i c i a l 
review were not discussed. Thus, in examining Utah 's system of 
post -depr ivat ion r e l i e f , i t may be useful to consider the j ud i -
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cial review available in Utah against administrative review. 
Judicial review generally carries with it greater weight than 
does an administrative hearing. 
Howeverr on any scalef the Utah standard of administra-
tive hearing and judicial review of license suspension decisions 
is more than sufficient. Section 41-2-20 requires the reviewing 
court to determine whether or not the department's suspension 
decision was "arbitrary and capricious." The Utah Supreme Court 
has approved the arbitrary and capricious standard. Utah Depart-
ment of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commissionr 658 
p.2d 601 (Utah 1983). The Administrative Services court dis-
cussed two standards of review which it denoted "arbitrary and 
capricious." Under the first such standard discussed, the agen-
cy is afforded great deference. Under this standard the agency 
decision should be upheld if "there is evidence of any substance 
whatever which can reasonably be regarded as supporting the 
determination made." (Citation omitted.) Administrative Serv-
i££S, Id. at 609. 
This standard has been held to provide a constitution-
ally sufficient level of review by Utah district courts. See, 
e.g., Williams v. Schwendiman. Third Judicial District Memorandum 
Decision, Judge Russon, Civil No. C84-2196, June 12, 1984. In 
these administrative drivers license decisions, it has frequently 
been applied by district courts in examining, and even occasion-
ally reversing, departmental suspension decisions. The fact 
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that the courts use this standard in reversing departmental 
decisions demonstrates that it is meaningful. 
Other western states, pursuant to their implied consent 
laws, afford agency revocation and suspension decisions great 
deference. For example, both Idaho and Colorado limit judicial 
review to a review to the agency record, and apply the "clearly 
erroneous" or "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. 
See, e.g. Davis v. Colorado Department of Revenue. 623 P.2d 874 
(Colo. 1981), Mason v. State. 653 P.2d 803 (Idaho App. 1982). 
Although this "arbitrary and capricious" standard of 
review sufficiently protects the appellant's constitutional 
guarantee to due process, the Utah Administrative Services court 
articulated another "arbitrary and capricious" standard which 
could also be employed by a court in reviewing license suspension 
decisions. 
Under the second and stricter standard set forth in 
Administrative Service, a court will not uphold an agency deci-
sion if there is simply "evidence of any substance whatever" 
supporting the determination. Rather, the reviewing court must 
determine whether or not the agency decision "falls within the 
limits of reasonableness or rationality." Administrative Serv-
ices, supra at 610. This standard of reasonableness and ration-
ality, which the Administrative Services court denotes as a 
standard of "arbitrary and capricious" review, applies to agency 
decisions involving mixed fact and law questions. Id. at 609-
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610. Thus, if the court finds, for example, that the issue of 
whether or not the arresting officer had reasonable cause to 
believe that the driver was driving while under the influence is 
a mixed fact/law question, the court may apply the stricter 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review testing the reason-
ableness and rationality of the administrative decision. 
Testing the reasonableness and rationality of the 
departmental suspension decision based on the agency record is a 
significant and sufficient form of review. So significant is 
this form of review that the New Mexico implied consent scheme 
employs it for the review of the one-year license revocations. 
Stater Department of Motor Vehicles v. Gober, 513 p.2d 391 (N.w. 
1973), New Mexico Stat. Section 66-8-112 (F) (1978). Where one-
year revocations are concerned, Utah, on the other hand, grants a 
de novo review of the revocation decision—a form of review 
affording the agency even less deference. Section 41-6-44.10. 
To summarize, Administrative Services articulates two 
standards of review which it denotes "arbitrary and capricious." 
The first standard, allowing greater agency deference is, as 
other states have found, constitutionally sufficient. If, howev-
er, the Court finds that this standard is lacking, Administra-
tive Services makes available a stricter standard of review under 
which the reasonableness and rationality of the agency decision 
is tested. Both standards provide drivers, like the appellant, 
whose licenses have been temporarily administratively suspended, 
with meaningful judicial review of the suspension decision. 
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POINT VI 
THE DRIVER LICENSE SUSPENSION HEARING 
ADMINISTERED BY A DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEE 
MAINTAINS CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF ADJUDICATORY 
AND PROSECUTORIAL ROLES, 
Although administered by a single hearing officer, a 
license suspension hearing incorporates an adequate separation of 
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions. Three pointsf which 
will be discussed below, are pertinent here. First, the hearing 
officer acts only in an adjudicatory and not prosecutorial capac-
ity. Second, even if the hearing officer functions, to some 
extent, in both roles, the constitution permits this combination. 
Third, to make out a constitutional claim, a specific bias, due 
to the combination of functions, must be demonstrated. The 
appellant has not shown and cannot show any specific bias. 
First, to understand that the hearing officer functions 
exclusively as a judicial officer, the nature of the privilege 
suspension hearing must be considered. The issues at the hearing 
are narrow. They are only whether or not the arresting officer 
had "reasonable grounds to believe" that the driver was in physi-
cal control of the vehicle while under the influence, and whether 
or not the blood alcohol test "results, if any" indicated a BAC 
of .08% or greater. Section 41-2-19.5(5). 
The hearing officer is very familiar with these issues. 
He or she knows the basic factors that go to each point. Any 
questioning in which the hearing officer participates is only to 
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speed up the hearing processr help ferret out these factors and 
develop a complete record. For example, in this case, the hear-
ing officer said to the officer, "I would like to go back to the 
driving pattern itself. What caught tsic] your attention to the 
vehicle itself?" (T. at 4.) Thus the hearing officer elicited 
pertinent information from the peace officer in a very objective 
manner. 
All parties, if they do not refuse to testify, may be 
questioned by the hearing officer as a judge may question various 
witnesses. The hearing officer takes all testimony into account. 
Questioning and prosecution are not synonymous. Simply because 
the hearing officer is familiar with the narrow issues and may 
ask questions hearing on these issues does not mean that the 
hearing officer is taking on a prosecutorial role. The hearing 
officer acts in an adjudicatory truth-finding role exclusively. 
However, even if the hearing officer combines both 
judicial and prosecutorial roles, this combination is constitu-
tionally sound. In fact, the importance and use of this combina-
tion in the administrative process has been recognized and sanc-
tioned by Congress. Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. at 554(d) specifically provides that agencies and 
their members who "engage in investigating or prosecuting may 
also participate or advise in the adjudicating function." (Em-
phasis added.) 
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The combination of prosecutorial and judicial roles is 
well suited for hearings in which the determinative issues are 
relatively narrow and simple. It is not surprising that other 
states, like Utah, have chosen to employ this method in their 
implied consent/DUI revocation and suspension procedures. 
In Arizona, for example, if a driver refuses to submit 
to a blood alcohol test, his license is immediately suspended. 
The driver may request a hearing, which covers three narrow 
issues: (1) whether or not the arresting office had reasonable 
grounds to believe that the driver was in violation of the Arizo-
na implied consent law; (2) whether or not the driver was arrest-
ed; and (3) whether or not he refused to submit to the blood-
alcohol test. See Martin v. Superior Court, 660 P.2d 859, 860 
(Ariz. 1983). As in Utah, a hearing officer presides over the 
hearing. There is no separate prosecutor. The hearing officer 
therefore must ask questions. Id, 
In Martin v. Superior Courtf icL., the Arizona Supreme 
Court considered the constitutionality of this system which 
incorporated prosecutorial and adjudicatory roles in one individ-
ual. The same issue is presented here. Noting first that the 
similar statutory schemes of other western states have withstood 
constitutional attack, the Martin court went on to discuss the 
merits of the system. Id. at 861. Citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 
U.S. 35, 55 (1975), it found that the presumed fairness of hear-
ing officers taken together with the state's interest in a swift 
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and efficient method of handling impaired driversf and the tre-
mendous burden which would be imposed on the state if prosecutors 
were required to attend each of these civil hearings/ lead to 
only one answer—the court upheld the hearing systemf stating: 
There is nothing prejudicial about a hearing 
officer handling a non-criminal license 
suspension hearing without a prosecutor 
present to move the case forward. Given the 
limited scope of the hearing, the adequacy of 
judicial review and the presence of the 
respondent's counsel/ this combination of 
adjudicative and prosecutorial functions does 
not violate due process or equal protection. 
Xdjt. at 862. Considering the above-mentioned factors demonstrates 
that the combination of administrative functions is well suited 
for Utah's driving privilege suspension system. Like Arizona's/ 
the Utah procedure should be upheld/ for it maintains fairness 
and impartiality while facilitating government efficiency. 
Much more extreme administrative function combinations 
have been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. Withrow v. 
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975)r presented the issue of whether the 
combined investigatory and judicial functions of a Wisconsin 
state examining board complied with the Due Process Clause. The 
board had the statutory authority to "investigate/ hear and act 
upon practices of [medical practitioners] . . . inimical to the 
public health." It even had the authority to instigate criminal 
proceedings if it found probable cause of criminal behavior. Id. 
at 38/ N.l. 
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In Withrow, isL, the board held two investigative 
hearings. The first of these was closed to the public. The 
accused and his attorney were allowed to attend. However, they 
were not allowed to cross-examine witnesses. After the second 
investigative hearing the board issued its finds and conclusions 
and suspended the doctor's license to practice medicine. IiL_ at 
39-42. 
In examining the Wisconsin system, the United States 
Supreme Court first stated that biased decision-makers are con-
stitutionally unacceptable. It identified situations in which 
impermissible prejudice could occurf such as "those in which the 
adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and in which 
he has been the target of personal abuse or criticism of the 
party before him." (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Id, 
at 47. However: 
The contention that the combination of inves-
tigative and adjudicatory functions necessar-
ily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias 
in administrative adjudication has a much 
more difficult burden of persuasion to carry. 
It must overcome a presumption of honesty and 
integrity in those serving as adjudicators; 
and it must convince thatf under a realistic 
appraisal of psychological tendencies and 
human weakness, conferring investigative and 
adjudicatorial powers on the same individuals 
poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudg-
ment that the practice must be forbidden. 
XcL. at 47. (Emphasis added.) 
Emphasizing the necessity of actual bias, the court 
went on to discuss cases involving similar issues. One of these 
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was Richard v. Perales. 402 U.S. 389 (1971). There the Court 
"sustained against due process objection a system in which a 
Social Security examiner has responsibility for developing the 
facts and making a decision as to disability claims, and observed 
that the challenge to this combination of functions 'assumes too 
much and would bring down too many procedures designed/ and 
working wellf for a governmental structure of great and growing 
complexity.1" Withrow v. Larkin, £jipna at 4 9-5 0. 
The high court found nothing inherently unconstitution-
al with the agency decision-maker having taken on another admin-
istrative role. In factf it stated that such a combination of 
functions is often necessary. It promotes efficient government 
while protecting individual rights. Thusf the court sanctioned 
the Wisconsin system which combined investigative and adjudica-
tory functions in a single body, responsible for suspending the 
physician1s license to practice medicine. The petitioner's 
inability to show actual prejudice or bias was significant to the 
decision. 
Another case in which a hearing officer's potential 
bias was at issue, and which demonstrates the significance of 
actual bias, is Black v. Corporation Division. 634 P.2d 1383 (Or. 
App. 1981). In BLacLk, the commissioner held a hearing on the 
petitioner's allegedly fraudulent sale of securities. As in the 
present case, the petitioner in Black claimed that the hearing 
violated his due process rights by combining the roles of prose-
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cutor and adjudicator, in that the hearing officer questioned 
witnesses. Id, at 1384. After noting that the petitioner must 
show actual bias, the court stated: 
No prejudice resulted. The hearing officer's 
questions did notf in form or in substance, 
evidence bias or tend to influence witnesses. 
Petitioner had the opportunity to, and did, 
examine and cross-examine witnesses. The 
hearing officer merely performed his duty to 
develop a full record for the Commissioner"s 
review. tliL. at 1384.] 
As in JBJLacJif the driver/appellant in this case has 
demonstrated no actual bias on the part of the hearing officer. 
Additionally, the appellant, as in ELLacikf had an opportunity and 
did (through her attorney) question witnesses. The appellant 
also had the opportunity to testify herself and add more to the 
record. 
The Utah Supreme Court also apparently requires a 
showing of actual prejudice in cases like the present one. In 
Vali Convalescent and Care Institute v. Industrial Commission, 
649 P.2d 33 (Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme Court examined an em-
ployer's claim that he was denied due process due to prejudice, 
because his good cause hearing was held before employees. Stat-
ing that federal due process law is "highly persuasive" in inter-
preting the due process clause of the Utah Constitution, id* at 
35, 36, the Utah Supreme Court cited In re Murchisonf 349 U.S. 
133 (1955), Gibson v. Berryhill. 411 U.S. 564 (1973), Ward Vt 
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), and other cases relied on by the 
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United States Supreme Court in Withrow v. Larkin, sjxgza, in which 
combined agency functions and prejudice were at issue. Id. at 
37. The Utah court examined the system for risk of actual bias 
derived from an actual, direct pecuniary interest of the deci-
sion-maker in the decision. Finding no such interest, the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld the agency decision. 
Thus, in Utah, a due process claim such as the appel-
lant's, necessitates a showing of actual prejudice and not merely 
a claim of combined functions. No such specific bias has been 
claimed or shown in this case. 
To summarize, the hearing received by the appellant 
granted due process and an opportunity for a pre-suspension 
hearing for three reasons. First, there was no combining of 
prosecutorial and adjudicative roles. The hearing officer func-
tioned objectively and compatibly with his statutory duty. 
Second, even if the hearing officer had performed in both capaci-
ties, the combination was not constitutionally impermissible and 
is, in fact, employed successfully by other states as well. 
Finally, the appellant has not met her burden of proving actual 
bias, or showing specifically that she received prejudiced treat-
ment. The departmental decision temporarily suspending Ms. 
Moon's driving privileges should, therefore, be upheld. 
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ALL IMPAIRED DRIVERS IN UTAH ARE TREATED 
ON A RATIONAL BASIS IN ACCORD WITH 
THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE. 
In examining equal protection claimsf courts employ 
either the "strict scrutiny" or the "rational relationship" 
standard of review. The strict scrutiny standard is appropriate 
where statutory distinctions involve either a "suspect class" or 
"fundamental right." 
In this case, neither a "suspect class" nor "fundamen-
tal right" is involved. That is, because the public safety 
statutes, and health/ safety and welfare issues involved here do 
not affect an interest specifically guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion/ the integrity of the political process/ or have a dispro-
portionate impact on a discrete and insular minority/ U.S. v. 
Carolene Products/ 304 U.S. 144/ N. 4f Berlingheieri Vt Pirector 
of Motor Vehicles, 657 P.2d 383/ 387 (Cal. 1983)/ the "rational 
relationship" test should be applied. See alsof T.T.N.P. Co. v. 
State, etc., 665 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982). Further/ the "rational 
relationship" test has been uniformly employed by courts in 
upholding driver laws against equal protection claims. Seef 
e.g./ Svedliund v. Municipality of Anchorage, 671 P.2d 378 (Alas-
ka App. 1983)/ State v. Thompson, 674 P.2d 895 (Ariz. App. 1983)/ 
Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles, sjipJLS/ Drake Vt Colo-
rado Department of Revenue, 667 P.2d 1360 (Colo. 1983). 
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Under the "rational relationship" test/ the statute is 
valid if the statutory distinctions at issue are rationally 
related to any legitimater conceivable statutory goal or legisla-
tive purpose, Sodel v, Indiana/ 452 u.s. 314, 332 (I98l)f citi-
zens/ etCt Vt frocal Agency Formation Cpm'p/ 654 p.2d l93f 197 
(Cal. 1982). 
In this casef the legislative goals are readily appar-
ent. See Section 41-2-19.5. The purpose of Utah's new DUI laws 
is to swiftly and efficiently remove impaired/ hazardous and 
unsafe drivers from Utah's highways. Undoubtedly this goal is 
legitimate. Thus the remaining question is whether or not the 
mechanics of the statute/ the statutory distinctions/ are ration-
ally related to the legitimate purpose of making Utah's highways 
safer. 
Under Section 41-6-44 the license of a driver who 
refuses to submit to a blood alcohol test is revoked for one 
year. On the other hand/ under Section 41-2-19.6/ a driver who 
consents to take a blood alcohol test faces only a 90-day suspen-
sion for the first offense. The choice is the driver's. Both 
the driver whose license is revoked for a year and the driver 
whose privilege is suspended for 90 days are entitled to a hear-
ing and judicial review of the administrative revocation or 
suspension decision. Refusal and pre-suspension hearings are 
substantially the same. At least one of the peace officers 
involved routinely appears and testifies at each hearing. In 
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both types of hearings, the driver has an opportunity for the 
presentation of evidence and cross-examination. Under Section 
41-2-20, suspension cases are reviewed to determine whether the 
agency decision was arbitrary and capricious. De novo review is, 
by statute, accorded "refusal" cases because of the longer conse-
quence. Further, there is no automatic rule regarding the re-
instatement of licenses pending appeal in either case. In both 
cases, reinstatement is left to the individual court's discretion 
on a statewide basis. 
Thus, the significant distinctions made under Sections 
41-2-19.6, 41-2-20 and 41-6-44.10 are the degree of deprivation 
(90 days suspension or one year revocation) and the type of 
judicial review available in each case. Both of these distinc-
tions are rationally related to the statutory plan to logically 
gain the legitimate goal of keeping Utah's highways safe by 
swiftly and efficiently removing scientifically-proven dangerous 
drivers through the administrative process. 
Blood alcohol test results are integral in implementing 
civil and criminal DUI systems. The statutorily required warning 
of a longer sanction for refusing to take a blood alcohol test 
stimulates driver cooperation in submitting to a test. Ths 
implied consent laws would serve little purpose if they did not 
provide impetus to submit to a scientific blood alcohol test. 
The significantly longer sanction for refusal logically provides 
such impetus. The blood alcohol test in turn facilitates evi-
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dence gatheringf promoting the efficiency and accuracy of subse-
quent civil, administrative and criminal hearings, and enhancing 
the administrative removal of dangerous drivers. 
For these reasons, the harsher consequences for refusal 
have withstood constitutional attack on equal protection grounds 
in many western states. Seef e.g. Svendland, si2Sl& (Alaska law 
making refusal a class A misdemeanor), Hernandez, .supjia (Califor-
nia law mandates six-month license suspension for refusal), 
DeScala v. Motor Vehicle Department of Revenue, 667 P.2d 1360 
(Colo. 1983) (ineligibility for probationary license due to 
refusal). 
Because of the necessary, different consequences to 
accomplish this legitimate governmental purpose, Utah grants 
different forms of judicial review. The constitutional suffi-
ciency of the level of review in suspension cases has already 
been discussed. Point V.B. shows that review of a suspension 
decision to determine whether or not it is arbitrary and capri-
cious protects drivers' due process rights. Other states employ 
similar modes of review, and in Utah, under Administrative Serv-
i£££, sugL&r this level of review is significant. Although this 
level of review is sufficient for suspension cases, because of 
the different nature of refusal cases it is obvious that a dif-
ferent form of review is in order. 
In providing de novo review for refusal cases, the 
legislature took two significant factors into account. First, 
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drivers who refuse to take a blood alcohol test are warned and 
suffer a greater deprivation (a year-long license revocation) 
than those who do not. As previously discussed/ this different 
sanction is necessary to the implied consent scheme. Secondly, 
although the officer testifies, less scientific evidence is 
available to the department when it revokes a license because of 
the lack of blood alcohol test results. Taken together, these 
two factors might indicate a need for a trial de novo rather than 
judicial review. This is all caused by the driver's choice, 
after warning. In other words, de novo review does not reward 
but rather insures the due process rights of those drivers who 
refuse to submit to a chemical test. 
Under Utah's new DUI laws, both classes of drivers, 
those who refuse and those who consent to taking a test, are 
given warning and notice, and treated fairly, rationally, and 
logically. The statutory distinctions, the means chosen to 
implement the implied consent law, are rationally related to the 
state's purpose and are necessary in implementing the DUI/implied 
consent system. 
CONCLUSION 
The arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe 
that appellant was driving under the influence, because of her 
driving pattern, the odor of alcohol about her person, and be-
cause of her unsatisfactory performance on the field sobriety 
test. 
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This affidavit, as well as other documentary evidence 
and the officer's testimony, show that one element under Section 
41-2-19.6—that is, that the test results indicated a BAC of .08% 
or greater—was established at the administrative proceeding. 
The other element, the officer's reasonable grounds, was also 
established. 
The intoxilyzer affidavit was properly admitted without 
an accompanying custodian's certificate. Because it evidenced 
sufficient trustworthiness to be admissible in a criminal pro-
ceeding, its admission in a civil, administrative proceeding 
where the strict rules of evidence do not apply, is particularly 
appropriate. 
The administrative agency may rely on the accuracy of 
the intoxilyzer test result where regulations mandate a calibra-
tion check at least every 40 days, and where the intoxilyzer 
affidavit shows the intoxilyzer machine was tested for calibra-
tion four days prior to the subject test. 
At the pre-suspension hearing, the hearing officer 
maintained a constitutional and unbiased hearing looking solely 
for the truth. There was substantial evidence and no showing of 
arbitrariness or capriciousness. 
Likewise, the hearing process and subsequent right to 
judicial review actually received by this driver and all others 
under Sections 41-2-19.6 and 20, have more than protected the 
appellant's due process rights in this driving privilege matter. 
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The statutory scheme is rationally related to the legitimate 
state purpose of effectively and efficiently removing dangerous 
drivers from the road, while balancing all interests and conse-
quences. 
For these reasons, the 90-day suspension decisions of 
the department and district court should be affirmed. 
DATED th isJl /* day of April, 1985. 
DAVID L. 
Att< 
KINSON 
neral 
BRUCE M. HALE 
Assistant Attorney General 
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"APPENDIX 1" 
Effective June 10, 1979 
Archives f i l e #3531 
Last revision April 1, 198 
BREATH TESTING REGULATIONS 
PEPARTMEMT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
ujftT uuenzn 
A - 1 
1. TECHNIQUES OR METHODS 
(A) Tests to determine the concentration of alcohol in a persons blood, 
may be applied to blood, breath or other bodily substances. Results shall 
be expressed as equivalent to grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic 
centimeters of blood. The results of such tests shall be entered in a 
permanent record book. 
(B) Written check lists, outlining the method of properly performing 
the tests in use under division (A) of this regulation, shall be available 
at each location where tests are given. The check list and the test record 
shall be retained by the operator administering the test or the arresting 
officer. 
Definition: A check list sets forth the steps, in sequence, that a 
breath test operator must follow. A square Is provided 
by each of the steps for the operator to check each one 
as it is performed to insure each is done, in sequence, 
to insure proper operation of the test instrument. 
I I . BREATH TESTS 
(A) Breath samples of alveolar air shall be analyzed with instruments 
specifically designed for the analysis of breath. The calculation of the 
blood alcohol concentration shall be on the basis of aveolar air to blood 
1. 
A-2. 
ratio of 2100:1. Breath samples shall be analyzed according to the methods 
described by the manufacturer of the instrument or instructions issued by 
the office of the Commissioner of Public Safety. 
I I I . CALIBRATION 
(A) Breath testing instruments must be calibrated on a routine basis 
not to exceed forty (MO) days. 
(B) Calibration tests must be performed by a technician using appropri-
ate solutions of ethyl alcohol, and using methods and techniques for calibra-
tion recommended by the manufacturer of the instrument or the office of the 
Commissioner of Public Safety. 
(C) Results of tests for calibration shall be kept in a permanent record 
book. A report of each calibration test shall be recorded on the appropriate 
form and sent to the supervisor of the Breath Testing Program. The super-
visor of the Breath Testing Program is hereby designated as the official 
keeper of said records. 
IV . PROCEDURE FOR CALIBRATION OF INSTRUMENTS 
(A) Breathalyzer 
1. Machine heating properly: 
a. between 47 and 53 degrees centigrade 
2. 
A - 2 
Collection chamber output: 
a. COLD between 55 and 58cc!s 
b. WARM between 50 and 54cc!s 
NULL meter functioning properly: 
a. Must be able to achieve a balance and swing freely in both 
directions. 
Read light in mechanical center: 
Place two ampoules of the same control number in the holders, 
turn on the read light, balance galvanometer and check for 
mechanical center. Switch the ampoules, turn on the read 
light. The null meter should not swing more than I inch in 
either direction. 
Blood alcohol pointer slippage check: 
Balance the instrument with ampoules in the holders. Set 
the blood alcohol pointer on .20%, or center of the Blood 
Alcohol scale. Using the light carriage adjustment, and with 
the read light on, run the B.A. needle to .00% and back to 
.20%, observing to see that the null meter balances at the 
same time the B.A. needle reaches .20%. Then run the B.A. 
needle to .40% and back to .20% observing to see that the null 
meter balances at the .20% line on the blood alcohol scale. 
3. 
A 
6 . S u n n in in i in i  i HI i in in i nil 
At least three 1 5( simulator checks of a ki IOWI i value shall be 
r mi iin i I II i in " 1 1 i :!! 11: I I i<i i i i s 1: lbe i i 11 iiII . 011 p lu s 
or m i n u s ul I he ac tua l v a l u e of tht- kncwiii suliui uii, 
7, AimiI nl Check : 
A series of simulator tests with the accumulated total of .601 
shal " i i f "i1 (\u,J'" i,'iiitrol i lumber ~" u**nd 
wiih the instrument, "I he results of eat h simulator test must 
bf? within .01% plus "» i > ' " " , n I l ,•' ' "M C-In• | > ule 
si mi I mi I i11! i be observed to see if there is a slight yellow color, 
i ' i .iting the presence of pctasium dichi MI'MII I i i I ih 
iihii\ i' " iii ill mi ml the chemicals are correct v\ within allowed 
tolerances . 
(B) Intoxilyzer 
1 H a t e the mode selector switch i.". lhe zero set mode. 
OWER CHECK: With the power switch i.n, 
observe to see that ** <- **ei uioiuat- r cr~* n m>h r i 
.J n o ^ A r - • ie i n s t r u m e n t 
J . TEMPERATURE CHIT |\ i, , - ir i ;, till i-d n y 
warmed up, check lo sei? that the ready light is on, 
If" It is not yvarmed up, wait approximately Mi 
4. 
A 
to see that the ready light comes on. (This light 
indicates that the sample chamber is heated to the 
proper temperature.) 
INTERNAL PURGE CHECK: Put the mode selector in the 
air blank mode. Place thumb on the end of the pump 
tube to see that it is pumping air . Time the pumping 
sequence to see that it pumps for approximately 35 
seconds. 
ZERO SET AND ERROR INDICATOR CHECK: Set the mode 
selector in the zero set mode. Depress the zero adjust 
knob and adjust the digital display to a plus .000, .001, .002 
or .003 to see that you can achieve a proper zero set. Re-set 
the digital display above the acceptable plus .000 to .003. 
Place the mode selector to the test mode and observe to see 
that the error light comes on. Repeat, placing the digital 
display at minus .000 and observe to see that the error light 
comes on when the mode selector is placed in the test mode. 
FIXED ABSORBTION CALIBRATOR CHECK: With the test 
card in the printer, run a test on the fixed absorbtion calibra-
tor to see that the instrument gives the correct reading on 
the digital display and the printed test card. THIS CHECK 
NOT REQUIRED ON INSTRUMENTS NOT EQUIPPED WITH 
THE FIXED ABSORBTION CALIBRATOR. 
^
T 0 R CHECK: Run three * . i 
. an air > . . - o-- ^dtr ,ytv bserve 
see that the cor rcK.t readings, w i th in r s 
ui uie actt i>'£ z j j i t i \ 
p r in ted on the test card for each simulator test and a .00% 
. a id ing for each air bank. 
8 PRlf ITER DEAC1 1'V-A TOR CHECK: Run a simulator t f s l ., I I , 
I"! I in "IIH" proper zero set range, to see 
that the p r in te r is deactivated and wil l i tot pi it i t . 
\ i Q1 1A i i I ' IC / i 1 10! IS 01 : ' P ERSONNEL 
( A l ** Hv/ a Qualified operator who 
shall have completed the operators course prescr ibed by I'li-i 
Commissioner ol Pn'l iln "H iff1"!! >, ' , i I « J .till U%L only ihuse 
instruments which they are cer t i f ied lo operate, 
( cert i f icat ion requirements: 
1. Must have ^n and pass a test 
approved by the Commbsu ne: _: ,„*:,., ,. „a (e i> , for each 
6. 
4 ' 
type of breath testing instrument for which he seeks 
certification. 
2 . Operators must complete an approved recertification 
training course and pass a test every two (2) years to 
maintain their certification. 
(C) Breath test technician requirements: 
1 . Must comply with one of the following: 
a. Must successfully complete the Breath Testing Supervisors 
course offered by Indiana State University• 
b . A manufacturers repair technician course for the breath 
testing instruments in use in the State of Utah. 
c. Be qualified by the nature of his employment or training 
to maintain and repair the breath testing instrument in 
question and to instruct in the proper operation of the 
instrument. 
REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATION 
(A) The Commissioner of Public Safety may on the recommendation 
of a technician, revoke the certification of any operator. 
7. 
Who obtains a cer t i f icat ion card falsely or deceit f 
i iiVhtj fails to comply w i th the foregoing provis ions govern ing 
the operat ion ^ i u u s* 
Who fails to demonstrate satlsfa* i 
uf i• I ,-i11iii11 j L'diii test ing ins t ruments . 
. p R n / i i i v r r j • n i n n i i LkSUNNEL 
~
l f
 —* l e construe ! as i^ a l idat ing the 
qual i f icat ion of o e r s ' ^ . r - *viouslv aual l* 
operat , ,„
 l o . programs ex is t ing pr ior to 
the prorruigatu *iese r e g u l a t i o n ;* ^ po11 op,r," "^ " '- (M 
cer t i f i ed un t i l surf have been requi red were 
these regulat ions not in ef fect . 
1 M I, • . i* i.'i •• "i-.!11! take effect as i f enacted contemporaneously wi th 
the other Breath Tes t ing Regulations of I I . Iiv i tiir i 
Safe1 \ i i , 
• In the ci'i.vi h "' - IV,;, * *i,« , i lk L>a1oW, it Is necessary ! 
t l ie peat- t h and welfare of the inhabitants of the State of I MM 
that th is regulat ion becor i, I I , I miirdiatelv. 
8. 
INT0X1LYZER - BREATHALYZER OPERATOR TRAINING 
Training for original certification is to be conducted by a Breath 
Testing Technician and should include the following: 
1 hour. . .Welcome, registration, preview of Alcohol and Traffic Safety. 
3 hours. .Effects of Alcohol in the Human Body. 
3 hours. .Operational Principles of Breath Testing 
2 hours. .Alcoholic Influence Report Form. 
2 hours. .Testimony of the Arresting Officer. 
3 hours..Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing. 
1 hour. . .Detcting the Drinking Driver. 
8 hours. .Laboratory Participation. (Running Simulator tests on the 
instruments and tests on actual drinking subjects). 
1 hour. . .Examination and Critique of Course. 
Training for recertification is to be conducted by a Breath Testing 
Technician and should include the following: 
2 hours. .Effects of alcohol in the Human Body. 
2 hours. .Operational principles of Breath Testing. 
1 hour.. .Alcohol Influence Report Form and Testimony of Arresting Officer. 
2 hours..Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing and Detecting and the Drinking 
Driver. 
1 hour. . .Exam. 
9. 
r Anyone having previously ' M M ess^'iHy mnpleted a twen ty - fou r (?fl) 
" , in ipf i ,i!<iii »» bchool iiitiy be i 'ecertit ied at anytime by successfully 
completing an eight (8) hour recert i f icat ion < b i""i" 
cer t i f ied in \\n inn -i l i i iyf,xj uI breath tes t ing Instrument af ter 
eight (8) hours ins t ruc t ion per ta in ing to the instrument in «"|"p n< n 
10 
»•
 w « » * * « # n w 4 4 i | d i a i O L i i d i * 
I L-ieath testing instrument, INTOXILYZER, serial number *2J7^/&Z f 6O 
located at 5^1 $/2£7~J/2A£ /*/) was properly checked by me/us in the course 
of official duties, on 2S^y^/// 1 9 j F ^ a t JV3o pU, 
7, Tbls, was done according to the standards established by the Commissioner of 
the Utah Department of Public Safety. 
3 This is the oificial record and notes ol fl'ih, initio mliu n n lui I i re made ai the 
time these tests wrie dcmf 
I F U L L P O W I N G T E I J , IJ'J WLHL MA I Hi 
Electrical power check: {Power switch 
Temperature check (Ready light is on) 
indicator light is on) 
YES 
UK 
Internal purge check: (Air pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds) f *% 
Zen> set, Error indicator, and Printer check: 
(Zero set at .000, .001, .002, .003.) 
(•With proper zero set , printer works properly) 
(Error light comes on when operated with wrong zero set) 
[Printer deactivated when error light is on) 
Fixed absorbtion calibrator test (if equipped) /i/^/ / y v r ( / / "«ii,;» 
^ (Beads within » fill of calibration setting) / 
Checked with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests within • .01%) 
feives readings in percent blood alcohol by weight 
alcohol pfir 100 cubic centimeters of blood. 
MRS REQUIRED
 M A/&A/& - _ . . _ _ 
(If yes, explain) 
simulator solution win... ol the correct kind and properly compounded. 
The rp'.ul! •. of this it r«f ii.how that the instrument is working properly. 
prior check of this instrument was done oil ? yZ/^y 
(2^ 
i ) 
NO 
( ) 
( ) 
I ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
f ^ 
W^\ 
l'j 
ATM TFST TECHNICIAN (S) 
w^Lg^ 
:E OF UTAH am. 
tfZcdZ 
OV , 
y s^ p \ ; : v 
{ribbedr£ruf sVmfn before me thi«; j ^ 
T/we, on oath, state that the foregoing is t r ue Q 
^ V c *y*(\r s?/i*J ArsJ**. 
-rf%£' (1^JS/X6-s: 
day ol 
•y Public--*.;; 
r v^ 
>mm issioA expires / j ^ ^ ^ 
t.H y of re si 
C O L ' f i l , 
19?jf . 
rhJtAr 
idence 
" 19.i7 
I e r . idencp 
Ml 
BUrrouAtti 
- -^©?-
CM! 1NT0X1LYZER 
OPERATIONAL CHECK LIST- A 
LOCATION c^° c?'*-<-S £-*•£" ? 
SUBJECT 
MACHINE! ty/OlStO, 
OPERATOR u£L "Zr< / ' 
MAKE CERTAIN POWER SWITCH IS IN THE "ON" 
POSITION. WAIT UNTIL THE READY LIGHT COMES ON. 
^ 1 
RE-
INSERT TEST RECORD CARD. 
CONNECT BREATH TUBE TO THE PUMP TUBE. 
TURN MODE SELECTOR SWITCH TO ZERO SET. ADJUJ 
ZERO SET KNOB SO THAT DISPLAY READS .003.(^002, 
.001, or .000. ^ - " " 
TURN MODE SELECTOR SWITCH TO AIR BLANK. 
AFTER AIR BLANK CYCLE IS COMPLETED, TURN MODE 
SELECTOR SWITCH TO ZERO SET. READJUST ZERO 
SET KNOB TO OBTAIN PROPER ZERO. ' °o2. 
TURN MODE SELECTOR SWITCH TO BREATH MODE. 
DISCONNECT THE BREATH TUBE FROM THE PUMP 
TUBE. HAVE SUBJECT BLOW INTO BREATH TUBE 
UNTIL SAMPLE IS COMPLETED. 
CONNECT BREATH TUBE TO THE PUMP TUBE. TURN 
MODE SELECTOR SWITCH TO AIR BLANK. 
HPT-20 (P-133A) 
10 62 
n 
V , l V \ l INCORPORATED 
INTOXlilYZER TEST RECORE 
1NTOXILYZER PRINT C( 
A-AIRBUANK 
B-BREATH-
C - CALIBRATORtSimu 
OBSERVED SUBJECT 
FOR REQUIRED OBSERVA1 
PERIOD AND FOLLOWEI 
CHECK LIST 
QfHWATOW'S IN IT IAL 
I N T O X I L Y I K W UOCATIC 
VKL C/K*0 
JUtMJJAIuiatBHft. 
Q/.-rn 
TIMK r i « » T O H * K * V « 0 T I M « TWST STA 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND/OR^lEMA 
DUI REPORT FORM 
CASE IDENTIFICATION: ^ 
Date " y /ZS f f&y Day S***/^ Acc ident_^^2 Case # CX^/// Time Prepared gvs 
Subjects Name t/^/r! g - /JS**^ , A d d r e s s / ^ 2^<?^t^-<p K^r. c*S>y,. 
Place of Employment U$ 6 l W /- £Jf*s£.f- Address /&£ J O J - / *4> <T / J & - * __ 
Home Telephone Number o 2 / y V - T y Work Telephone Number y i ? & 6 3l 
D.O.B; /Z/s/A-y Driver License # ~?73Q/6? Time of Arrest psr-fO 
Place of Arrest ^ZftfQ, ^Zr&g^ Charges /Pf^— 
Arresting Officer, ^ y y ^ r f ^ Assisting Officers fC? 'dci^c* S^ <£ £,*r^ 
Arresting Agency K4/tfr\ I 
Year 8 3 Color c5^X^e Make /T4*£* M o d e l ^ ^ ^ ^ 
License* and state / V / * 7 / / 7 r ^ r / r Disposition " ~ 7 £ * W £ ^^sP^ 
Registered Owner S%*—*— Address 
WITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically) 
Name Address Tele. # Age/DOB 
7 OpJ?*~ ifZ^ss-o 2. j w * < 3 - 4 „ ^ « ^ m /eA/r? 
3. 
4. 
5. 
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL: 
The ja£ts establishingthe subject's actual physical control of a motor vehicle are: 
_ta£ts establishingthe subject s actual physical control o 
DRIVING PATTERN: 
Subject's location when first observed Sfc£n tjj/3 7^0^" Tjmfi: C/JS~ 
The facts observed regarding driving pattern: ^ f / . v ^ L ^ ^ *,**£ </<^-~.<L£ ^..^<X^K£. ?£J* 
-p^ 
PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT; 
^ * X 
. 
^ 
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
Odor Of alrfoholic beverage ut-& 
Speech / / * u J , / - 'y , 
Balance <J'™Z/i*?4 c—sC- ^ /r^> , ^ ^ ^ 
Signs or complaints of injury or illness A/mr 
Other physical characteristics ^*~z 
S&fS&P RUG 011884 A-DRIVER LICENSE 
FIELD SOBJUETY THSTS: (Describe subject's actions) 
1. HStLxr." ?;*>&*"» 
^^ / < - [AnJ \/ u> tj>,y 
3 /&m . 7 
*• r*.£iLJ.l» /^
 r~U , 
6: /g; Pr/f ft* lup ^ t . L. / , / K / ^ / y . f r 
7. /Vtr^uf^-iZ y^^LL -^y £*/C/^ 7*"^ 
Were tests demonstrated by officer? u ^ Subject's ability to follow instructions ^^X w o 
en^U. dL^-<?«^Sr M v ; y to e?se< ^ g c / ^ - * ~ - . LI^ULJ/ ^O S*l~3-zs rt^cc^ t^<^> ^r<r"~ s*<^r*~ 
SEARCHES y 
A. Vehicle: - ^ 
Was subject's vehicle searched? Where? ~> c*~~c <^^<^^-^C 
When? Evidence
 5 
Person who performed the search 
B. Subject: . _ ^ 
Was subject's person seached? Where?_ 
When? Evidence Found _A/cr^r 
Person who performed the search _ «-, C'&O' 
CHEMICAL TESTS: I 
Mr. or Mrs 1/JtJfi , do you understand tha^J/yeu are under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alchohol (drugs)? Response, (if any) lA^/^^^^M^ Jf** ^~ 
I hereby request that you submit to a ctamical tesMo determine the alcohol (drug) content of your 
blood. I request that you take a f/s#**aJr<l test. 
(blooc^reatMbrine) 
p The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was administered: 
/Resu l t s indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the 
/ existence of a blood alcohol content or presence of drugs sufficient to render you 
/ incapable of safely driving a vehicle can, result in suspension or revocation of your 
I license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
What is your response to my request that you ^ubmit to a chemical test? Response: 
# * * 
T.P 
Did subject submit to a chemipal tegl2 J ^ < > Type of test , 
Test Administered by /^<^eZ£^f Where? J ^ S^JZJ^A^ 
Whan? fr'^MTw Results * /t? Was subject notified of results? c^£-<s 
V 
(If the subject refuses the test, read the following) 
• The following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, however I must warn you that if you refuse, 
your license or permit to drive a motor vehicle can be revoked for one year with no 
provision for a limited driver's license. After you have taken this test, you will be 
permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer a test at your own expense, 
in addition to the one I have requested you to submit to, so long as it does no delay the 
test or tests requested by me. Upon your request, I will make available to you the results 
of the test if you take it. 
A-
i ne luuowing admonition was given by me to the subject: 
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent 
law which is civil in nature and separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain 
silent does not give you the right to refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to 
have counsel during the test procedure. Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, I 
will consider that you have refused to take the test. I warn you that if you refuse to take 
the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited 
license. 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: 
Was subject advised of lhefal lowing rights? V f C 3 When? 
By Whi^ ? ^ i^//k*,X V Where? />7^ l/^A^U 
\S\ 1. You have the right to remain silent. 
\/s 2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court ot law. 
V 3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being 
Questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you 
before any questioning, if you wish one. 
4. If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop 
answering questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during 
questioning. 
Were the following waiver questions asked? 
jO 1. Do you understand eayh of th^se ri^MsA^have explained to you? 
Response 
each ot these 
^ ^ X j 2 . Having these rights in mind, dp you w 
7 Response uP^4- 6^1 
2. i i i ^ ish to talk to us now? 
INTERVIEW: 
Were you operating a vehicle? *d~^'4 ^ — 6 j t- '<*- s 
Where were you going? Alxm^^ / / * < y <-
What street or highway were YOU on? 'J. ^e__g *;*(* y<-**- '^t^f7L /~£h f£~i't~'£t5fi<T< 
Direction of travel? fJ^r- 7i*&tAit- £•*- ^ y A v r ~ ^ f ^ * 
Where did you start f r r"g> *?4rxr> C I Aj^S)/. jy J&Wr 
When? fa - ^ r *~»Vw What time is it now? ' / j ? / 9 / 
What is today's date? | p 1* trv 2 9 Date of week? & W / W ^ - /*£c» 
(Actual time 2 / V Date " 7 / g Day S l ~ 
What city or county are you in now? ££ ^ 
What were you doing during the last three hours? CO/pfe* fe~*7?' 
Have you be^n drinking? ,4-j*-***' S*<s-», 
What? 
fer e  ri i  /trJtSjJ ? ^ ( , 4 u 
fij^— *~£r^y How much? T5 
Where9 / ^ ^ / ^ / ^ r — 
When did you have your first drink? ^ 7 VSf) Last drfok? / / 3 f ) 
Are you under the influence of an alcohojic beverage (drugs) now? 7^ 
Are you taking tranquilizers, pills, medicines or drugs of any kind? . 
(What kind? get sample) 
When did you have the last dose? 
Are you ill? / 2 / < Q 
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions:) RECEIVED BY r,\\n A I I Q D / 
Were you involved in an accident today? nJ6 DRIVER LICENSE MUb UI U ^ 
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident? 
If so, what? ; When? 
How much? A~ l ( £ 
v t i tun wvuunnLJiwuw v n n r s v * * . *~^) / / //// / / 
ATTACHED DOCUMENTS 
I have attached the following documents to this report: 
1.>2 Copy of citation/temporary license 
2. *iB Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit. 
3. • Traffic accident report. — 
4. !& Other documents (specify) 7*7r~^,/^^ 
Date *jL/%&/&/ Time j&fr**^ Report was completed. 
tify and swear that I am a sworn Utah peace officer and that I have prepared the above report form and thai 
nformation on the report form and the attached documents are true and correct to my knowledge and beliel 
that the report form was prepared in the regular course of my duties. It is my belief the subject was in violatior 
action 41-6-44 U.C.A. at the date, time and place specified in this report. 
TE OF UTA 
JNTY OR kLv ^#JL?. / s s 
Signature of Peace Officer /sz^ 
Law Enforcement/Agency 
Date. ^ _ , 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /s2X~ day of .C^L^f.C^lC. , 19_£_i 
NOTARY PUBLIC^ , ^ O . ^ , 
iding at: .*$UJ .7Stt<t^ LcZy . / 3 ^ " 
Commission Expires: 
The original of this form must be sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to: 
Officer of Driver License Services 
4501 South 2700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
A -
"APPENDIX 3" 
DRIVER IMPROVEMENT AND CONTROL 
i of Tine Set 
ring for Hearing 
V ^-3? 10:#>/&i 
id Address of Attorney 
Witness 
Ui tness 
HEARING DECISION 
Name and Address of Driver 
IrAHA:/ d? M>6Ay 
L d<s%£7/ or 
Date of Birth DL Number 
/9^/Sf \T73&/&? 
Date of Arrest 
-7'99-W 
T.nrar-fnn of Hearing 
Joi/c 
Rearing Officer 
V&M/S tftfcAQ 
XI 
Arresting Officer 
; em/&, Au#&> 
Aeencv 
£MP 
Witness 
Witness 
OPENING STATEMENT 
earing is being conducted at the driver's request in accordance with Section A1-2-19 
ode Annotated, having fceen arrested for driving vhile under the influence of alcohol 
gs or a combination of alcohol and drugs. 
* rules of evidence and procedure shall not strictly apply. However, as the Hearing 
r, I will take sworn testimony and considur all relevant evidence presented at this 
g-
vided for in UCA 41-2-20, if your driving privilege is suspended, you shall have the 
to petition a court of record in the county in which you reside within thirty days 
the effective date of such suspension for judicial review by the court. 
testifying will be sworn, and the hearing shall proceed. 
strative notice is taken of the fact that the Office of Driver License Services is ii 
t of the following documents and information which are official records on file with 
apartment: 
No 
| ) xhe officer'$ sworn report in compliance with UCA 41-z-iy.o. 
( | A citation indicating the driver's arrest for a violation of UCA 41-6-44. 
{ | Notice served by the officer of the Department's intent to suspend, and 
information on how to receive a hearing by the Department. 
A-18 
Yes No 
( j Test machine record of test results. 
r>4 1 1 Operational checklist of test instrument* 
[y^\ ( | Utah Highway Patrol record of the chemical test machine 
maintenance test and affidavit pursuant to UCA 41-6-44.3. 
| 1 l^xf Other (ie. Documents and/or information received in behalf of the 
driver and/or other evidence received which is made official 
record for the purpose of this hearing). Explain: 
The sworn testimony of Officer: 
(a) Facts leading the peace officer to believe the driver had been driving or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or a combination of alcohol and any drug: "Z&Zy^t'-'ZZ-
7»e/£/e&. /Z)£*s7y/=y&> Js pre*:/ <S. /%&>*/< ~7&>4/&e. AioeS: 
(b) The driver vas placed under arrests BO 1 1 yes t^vt 
Charge: ^^L^ • 
(c) The driver submitted to a chemical test as requested by a peace officer 
vhich shoved a test result of i/Q 1. 
(d) The driver vas advised prior to the chemical test that results could lead to 
suspension of his/her driving privilege: no r~] yes KyQ 
(e) Officer who administered chemical test was certified to do so: no \^} yes 
(f) Proper procedure was performed or observed by reporting officer in the 
administration of the chemical test: no I—J yes r~l (explain 
procedure)! ^ -j&Sr/FYeO /& &*S Q3e7V=/(& /F*Z> &T 
(g) Evidence and/or information received indicating the t e s t machine vas 
was not \^} in proper working order at the time t e s t was administered 
^explai*): g/# £ Y2EST//46W &ti> 7 ^ VM* /AJ7Q& YZ&t 
(h) DUI Report Form was properly notarized: no J—I yes fZA (explain): 
or other witness for reporting off icer: 
0 77-frc^ /fr/ //J *7ZY/cYz&& T ^ S T A-21 
Substance of statements and/or questions by driver's legal counsel: 
f&'ZJ^ /?&<*(/&> 7?i&?£r JZ//?S £&?<uy /JO /?/?6&teOT 
d?^^/^/e /2&C&7- /%<s>, Mt>4/ a//?-? //or 7?ey//;§ 
7Z rftf&t ep&> "Ms tf&z€//j&? d&zcezz. /fzs& /T&^< 
7^^/ fee * /?tzse& , 39£ S€6KC y ^/Zfrsr &o j&&> 
t/J V7te /Yezz ^3^^y 7ZT73 - ^ s ^ % ^ y ) 
/V/^ /&&3&U, 
AVING HEARD AND RECEIVED EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THOSE PRESENT AT THIS HEARING, THE 
EPARTMLNT NOW MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF FACT: 
A. Tbat the peace officer bad reason to believe tbat the driver was 
not r—I in violation of UCA 41-6-44. 
KA was 
B. Tbat the driver was was not placed under arrest for a 
violation under UCA 41-6-44. 
C. That the chemical test was F71 was not I I administered by an officer 
certified to do so. Lr-1 '—! 
D. That all operational procedures and requirements were f\/l were not 1 1 
met to insure proper working order of the test machine. ' 
E. That all procedures and requirements were were not followed by 
the reporting officer pursuant to UCA 41-2-19.6. (Explain what procedures 
were not followed if any): 
A-
That there was s was not • evidence of a chemical test and/or 
other basis for the officer's determination that the driver was in violation 
of 41-6-44. Test results % or other (ie. drugs); explain: 
G. Other (not covered above); explain: 
JISU-USIUJNS: 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ALL OF THE 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS REQUIRED TO SUSPEND THE DRIVING PRIVILEGE PURSUANT TO UCA 
41-2-19.6 WERE [32 W 3 ^ N 0 T CZ] IN PLACE IN THIS CASE, AND THE FOLLOWING 
DECISION IS RENDERED: 
fed To suspend the driving privilege by authority 
of UCA 41-2-19.6 
- • To tafce no action 
>iLments by hearing off icer: 
Hearing Officer 
/ • 
FOR CENTRAL OFFICE USE ONLY 
Titles 
e; 
A-22 
"APPENDIX 4 " 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
A t t o r n e y Genera l 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN 
D i v i s i o n Chief 
BRUCE M. HALE 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General 
Tax and B u s i n e s s R e g u l a t i o n D i v i s i o n 
130 S t a t e C a p i t o l 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84114 
Te lephone : 533-5319 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VICKIE MOON, ) 
) 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, D i r e c t o r 
D r i v e r L i c e n s e S e r v i c e s , 
Respondent . 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r hav ing come be fo re t h e 
Cour t fo r h e a r i n g on September 1 8 , 1984, and t h e m a t t e r being 
argued and s u b m i t t e d on memorandum and the Court having 
r e c e i v e d t h e r e c o r d of t h e Department of P u b l i c Safe ty and 
hav ing reviewed t h e m a t t e r and s t u d i e d t h e memorandum and c a s e s 
c i t e d and be ing a p p r i s e d i n t h e p remises now makes t h e 
f o l l o w i n g : 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 . The Court f i n d s t h a t t h e agency r eco rd shows t h a t 
t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l , competent ev idence t o s u p p o r t t h e 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
Case No. C84-5182 
findings of the hearing officer of the Department of Public 
Safety. There i s a residuum of evidence and the Court finds 
tha t the p la in t i f f was legal ly arrested for "driving under the 
influence of alcohol ." 
2 . The Court further finds that a l l of the elements 
of Utah Code Ann. 41-2-19.6 were proven before the Agency. The 
Court speci f ica l ly finds that the evidence before the Agency is 
competent and shows that the arres t ing officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe that p la in t i f f may have been in violat ion of 
Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44, arrested him, requested tha t he take an 
intoxi lyzer t e s t , and advised the p la in t i f f that a resul t s 
indicating a .0 8% or more by weight of alcohol in the blood 
shal l and can resu l t in the suspension or revocation of the 
person's l icense or privilege to operate a motor vehicle, tha t 
a chemical t e s t was voluntari ly agreed to by pla int i f f , and 
that i t was properly given by a cer t i f ied operator showing 
re l iab ly a resu l t of .11% of alcohol by weight by p l a i n t i f f ' s 
blood. 
3. The Court further finds that the DUI report was 
properly signed, notarized, countersigned and forwarded to the 
Office of Driver License Services within five days of the 
arrest, that plaintiff requested a timely hearing which was 
held with the plaintiff, as well as the officer, offering sworn 
testimony. 
2 
4. The hearing was granted prior to 3 0 days from the 
date of the a r res t and the s ta tu te grants the plaint i f f the 
opportunity to appeal to th i s Court for a hearing on the record 
and a determination of whether or not the Department was a rb i -
t rary or capricious. 
5. Pursuant to 41-2-19.6 the p l a i n t i f f ' s license was 
suspended. The p la in t i f f appealed that adverse decision to 
t h i s Court for a review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 41-2-19.6 
and 41-2-20. 
6 . The Court f u r t h e r f i n d s t h a t t h e suspens ion of 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s d r i v e r l i c e n s e was n o t a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s 
and hereby a f f i r m s t h e suspens ion of p e t i t i o n e r ' s d r i v e r 
l i c e n s e . 
Having made t h e f o r e g o i n g f i n d i n g s of f a c t , t h e Court 
now makes i t s : 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that there was substantial 
competent evidence to support the Department's determination to 
sustain the Notice of Intention to Suspend p l a i n t i f f ' s p r iv i -
lege to operate a vehicle in the State of Utah served upon 
p la in t i f f when he was arrested. 
2 . There was competent evidence to support the 
finding and the Court concludes that the arrest ing officer had 
3 
A 
reasonable grounds to believe that the plaintiff may have been 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44, and that there was 
reliable test results which indicated a blood alcohol content 
of .16% of blood alcohol in the plaintiff/ or that the plain-
tiff had been operating a motor vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol rendering him incapable of safely driving the same. 
3. The Court concludes that the intoxilyzer machine 
was reliable and the results admissible before the Department 
pursuant to the presumption set forth in Utah Code Ann. 41-6-
44.5 and 44.3, and Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Ut. 
1983). 
4. The Court further concludes that under the 
definitions of arbitrary and capricious given in Utah Depart-
ment of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 
65 8 P.2d 601, that the Department of Public Safety's decision 
was not arbitrary or capricious. 
The Court having made the foregoing findings of fact 
and conclusions of lawf new makes the following: 
ORDER 
1. The Court vacates i t s Order of Reinstatement and 
hereby Orders the suspension of pe t i t i one r ' s driving license 
forthwith. 
4 
2. The decis ion of the Department of Public Safety, 
Office of Driver License Serv ices , i s sus ta ined and p l a i n t i f f ' s 
d r iv ing p r i v i l e g e s a re to be suspended or revoked as required 
by law. 
DATED t h i s _ / day of \yOV' 1984. 
's 
HONORABLE/DEAN E. CONDER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby c e r t i f y I mai led a t r u e and exac t copy of 
t h e f o r e g o i n g F i n d i n g s of F a c t , Conc lus ions of Law and Order, 
f i r s t c l a s s p o s t a g e p r e p a i d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. 
#8 Eas t Broadway 
Judge B u i l d i n g , S u i t e 426 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84111 
DATED t h i s lj) day of ^ | \00 1984. 
VICKIEl L. WALKER 
Legal S e c r e t a r y 
5 
"APPENDIX 5" 
OPERATORS' LICENSE ACT 41-2-19.5 
Upon the conclusion of such examination the department shall take such action 
as may be appropriate and may suspend or revoke the license of such person or 
permit him to retain such license, or may issue a license subject to restriction as 
permitted under section 41-2-9. Refusal or neglect of the licensee to submit to such 
examination shall be ground for suspension or revocation of his license. 
(h) No report authorized by section 41-2-12.1 shall contain any evidence of a 
conviction for speeding on an interstate system located in this state if the convic-
tion was for a speed of less than 71 miles per hour and did not result in an accident 
unless authorized in writing by the individual whose report is being requested. 
(i) The department may suspend the license of a person when the department 
has been notified by a juvenile court that the person has outstanding against him 
or her an unpaid fine or uncomplied-with restitution requirement levied b j order 
of a juvenile court, and the suspension shall remain m effect until the department 
is notified b^ the juvenile court that the order has been satisfied. No report autho-
rized by section 41-2-121 shall contain any evidence of such suspension. 
(j) The department may immediately suspend the license of a person if it has 
reason to believe that the person is the owner of a motor vehicle with respect to 
which a security is required under Chapter 41 of Title 31, and has operated the 
vehicle or permitted it to be operated within this state without the security being 
in effect. The provisions of sections 41-12-17 5 and 41-12-29 with respect to the sur-
render of license plates and registration of motor vehicles and the requirement of 
proof of financial responsibility apply to persons whose driving privilege is sus-
pended under this subsection If the department exercises the right of immediate 
suspension granted under this subsection (j), the notice and hearing provisions of 
subsection (b) apply. A person whose license suspension has been sustained or 
whose license has been revoked by the department under this subsection may file 
a petition within 30 days after the sustaining of the suspension or the revocation 
for a hearing in the matter which, if held, shall be governed by the provisions of 
section 41-2-20. 
History: C 1953, 41-2-19, enacted by L 1983, ch 183, § 22, 1983, ch 187, § 3, 1983, ch 
1978 (2nd S S ), ch 9, § 2, L 1983, ch 99, § 4; 192, § 1 
41-2-19.5. Purpose of revocation or suspension for driving under the influ-
ence. The legislature finds and declares that a primary purpose of the provisions 
in this code that relate to suspension or revocation of a person's license or privilege 
to operate a motor vehicle for driving with a blood alcohol content above a certain 
level or while under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or combination of alcohol 
and any drug, or for refusing to take a chemical test provided for in section 
41-6-4410, is safely protecting persons on roads and highways by quickly removing 
from those roads and highways persons who have shown they are safety hazards 
by driving with a blood alcohol content above a certain level or while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug or by refus-
ing to take a chemical test that complies with the requirements of section 
41-6-44.10. 
History: C 1953, 41-2-19 5, enacted by L 
1983, ch 99, § 5 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to driving while intoxi-
cated, establishing standards relating to, 
penalties for, and procedures to deal with, 
driving while intoxicated, repealing the sec-
tion which formerly set the absolute mini-
mum blood-alcohol content required to con-
vict for driving while intoxicated, and provid-
ing an effective date 
This act amends sections 41-2-2, 41-2-20, 
and 41-2-28, Utah Code Annotated 1953, sec-
tion 41-2-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by chapter 129, Laws of Utah 
1981, section 41-2-18, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as last amended b> chapter 152, Laws 
of Utah 1979, section 41-2-19, Utah Cbde 
Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 9, 
Laws of Utah 1978, Second Special Session, 
51 
41-2-19.6 MOTOR VEHICLES 
sections 41-2-29 and 41-2-30, Utah Code amended by chapter 2, Laws of Utah 1980, 
Annotated 1953, as last amended by chapter section 73-18-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
83, Laws of Utah 1967, section 41-6-4310, as last amended by chapter 183, Laws of 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended Utah 1977, and section 76-5-207, Utah Code 
by chapter 78, Laws of Utah 1957, section Annotated 1953, as last amended by chapter 
4 1
-
6
-
4>/teh Code A"noTta ted ^ t\ifo 63> L a w * of Utah 1981, enacts sections 
^^&ssn^^A 5° s s as X*M 5 «?4i-2;19 * ** ° * A™TJ 
Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 243, J?53' ^ e a l s A a n d Tef a^ts0 s e c t l o n A1ff> Laws of Utah 1979, section 41-6-44 10, Utah u t a h C o d e Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter chapter 242, Laws of Utah 1979, and repeals 
126, Laws of Utah 1981, section 41-22-14, section 41-6-44 2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by as last amended by chapter 4, Laws of Utah 
chapter 107, Laws of Utah 1971, section 1982, Second Special Session. - Laws 1983, 
63-43-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last ch. 99. 
41-2-19.6. Chemical test — Grounds and procedure for officer's request — 
Taking license — Report to department — Procedure by department — Sus-
pension. (1) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person 
may be violating or has violated section 41-6-44 the peace officer may, in connection 
with his arrest of the person, request the person to submit to a chemical test to 
be administered in compliance with the standards set forth in section 41-6-44.10. 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission to 
a chemical test that results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in the 
blood shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render the 
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle can, result in suspension or revocation 
of the person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to that chemical test and the results indicate a blood 
alcohol content of .08% or more, or if the officer makes a determination, based on 
reasonable grounds to believe that the determination is correct, that the person 
is otherwise in violation of section 41-6-44, the officer directing administration of 
the test or making the determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the 
department, immediate notice of the department's intention to suspend the person's 
privilege or license to drive. If the officer serves that immediate notice on behalf 
of the department he shall take the Utah driver license or certificate or permit, 
if any, of the driver, issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days, and supply 
to the driver, on a form to be approved by the department, basic information 
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the department. A citation issued 
by the officer may, if approved as to form by the department, serve also as the 
temporary license. 
(4) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the department within five 
days after the date of arrest and service of the notice the person's license along 
with a copy of the citation issued regarding the offense, and a sworn report indicat-
ing the chemical test results, if any, and any other basis for the officer's determina-
tion that the person has violated section 41-6-44, and the officer's belief regarding 
the person's violation of section 41-6-44. Each such report shall be on a form 
approved by the department and shall be endorsed by the police chief or his equiva-
lent or by a person authorized by him, other than the officer serving the notice. 
(5) Upon written request of a person who has been issued a 30-day license, the 
department shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 30 days 
after the date of arrest and issuance of the 30-day license, but the request must 
be made within 10 days of the date of the arrest and issuance of the 30-day license. 
A hearing, if held, shall be before the department in the county in which the arrest 
occurred, unless the department and the person agree that the hearing may be held 
in some other county. The hearing shall be documented and its scope shall cover 
the issues of whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person 
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to have been operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 41-6-44, whether the 
person refused to submit to the test, and the test results, if any. In connection 
with a hearing the department or its duly authorized agent may administer oaths 
and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of 
relevant books and papers. One or more members of the department may conduct 
the hearing, and any decision made after a hearing before any number of the mem-
bers of the department shall be as valid as if made after a hearing before the full 
membership of the department. After the hearing, the department shall order, 
either that the person's license or privilege to drive be suspended or that it not 
be suspended. A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this sub-
section, shall be for a period of 90 days, beginning on the 31st day after the date 
of the arrest. A second or subsequent suspension under this subsection shall be 
for a period of 120 days,'beginning on the 31st day after the date of arrest. The 
department shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee imposed under 
subsection 41-2-8(7), a fee of $25, which must be paid before the person's driving 
privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs, and which fee shall be can-
celled if the person obtains an unappealled department-hearing or court decision 
that the suspension was not proper. A person whose license has been suspended 
by the department under this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after 
the suspension for a hearing in the matter which, if held, shall be governed by 
the provisions of section 41-2-20. 
History: C 1953, 41-2-19 6, enacted by L. 
1983, ch 99, § 6 
41-2-20. Judicial review of license cancellation, revocation or suspension 
— Scope of review. Any person denied a license or whose license has been can-
celed, suspended or revoked by the department except where such cancellation or 
revocation is mandatory under the provisions of this act unless the suspension 
occurred pursuant to section 41-2-19 6 shall have the right to file a petition within 
thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in a court of record in the county 
wherein such person shall reside and such court is hereby vested with jurisdiction 
and it shall be its duty to set the matter for hearing upon ten days' written notice 
to the department; aftd thereupon to take testimony -aftd examine -mte -the facts 
Or i>nc case &a& te determine whether the petitioner k entitled to a license or k 
subject to cancellation, suspension er revocation -of license under -the provisions -of 
this aet. The court's jurisdiction is limited to a review of the record to determine 
whether or not the department's decision was arbitrary or capricious. 
History: L 1933, ch 45, § 20, 1935, ch 47, 
§ 2, C 1943, 57-4-23, L 1983, ch 99, § 7 
41-2-21. New license after revocation. (1) Any person whose license has been 
revoked under this act shall not be entitled to apply for or receive any new license 
until the expiration of one year from the date such former license was revoked 
or longer as provided in sections 41-2-18 and 41-2-19. Licenses which have been 
revoked may not be renewed, but application for a new license must be filed as 
provided in section 41-2-8, and a license so issued shall be subject to all of the 
provisions of an original license The department shall not grant the license until 
an investigation of the character, abilities and habits of the driver has been made 
to indicate whether it will be safe to again grant him the privilege of using the 
highways. 
(2) Any resident or nonresident whose operator's or chauffeur's license to oper-
ate a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended or revoked as provided in this 
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0*) (8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when s«eh the violation is coupled with an accident or collision in 
which aaeh the person is involved and when aaeh the violation has, in fact, been 
committed, although not in his presence, if the officer has reasonable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by 9t*eh the person. 
(t) (9) The department of public safety shall revoke suspend for a period of 90 
days tSe operator's or chauffeur's license of any person convictedTor the first "time 
under subsection (1) of this section2 and shall revoke for one year tEe" license of 
any person otherwise convicted under this section, except that the department may 
subtract from any suspension period the number of daysTor wEich a license was 
previously suspended under section 41-2-19.6 if the previous suspension was based 
on the same occurrence which the record of conviction is based upon! 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §34; C. 1943, 
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75, § 1; 
1967, ch. 88, §2; 1969, ch. 107, §2; 1977, ch. 
268, §3; 1979, ch. 243, SI; 1981, ch. 63, §2; 
1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, ch. 
103, §1; 1983, ch. 183, §33. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1983, ch. 183, discontinuing separate 
classification for chauffeur's license, is effec-
tive January 1,1984. 
The 1982 amendment increased the mini-
mum term in subsec. (d) from 30 to 60 days; 
deleted "not less than $100 nor more than" 
before "$299" in subsec. (d); inserted subsec. 
(e); redesignated former subsec. (e) as (f); 
increased the period of work from not less 
than two nor more than 10 days to not less 
41-6-44.2. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Section 41-6-44.2 (L. 1973, ch. 80, §2; 1982 
(2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 2), relating to driving with 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.3, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 243, § % L. 1983, ch. 99, § 14. 
than 10 nor more than 30 days in the first 
sentence of subsec. (f); added "or to obtain 
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facil-
ity" to the first sentence of subsec. (f); 
increased the periods in the second sentence 
of subsec. (f) from not less than 10 nor more 
than 30 days to not less than 30 nor more 
than 90 days; added "plus obtain treatment 
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility" to the 
second sentence of subsec. (f); inserted 
subsec. (g); redesignated former subsecs. (f) 
and (g) as (h) and (i). 
Effective Date. 
Section 2 of Laws 1982, ch. 46 provided 
that the act should take effect upon approval. 
Approved February 19,1982. 
blood alcohol content of .10% or higher, was 
repealed by Laws 1983, ch. 99, § 21. 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evidence. (1) The com-
missioner of public safety shall establish standards for the administration and 
interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath including standards of 
training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person 
was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol or driving with a blood alcohol content of .10% or greater statutorily pro-
hibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events 
to prove that the analysis was made and accuracy of the instrument were made 
pursuant to used was accurate, according to standards established in subsection 
(1) shall be admissible if: 
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the investiga-
tion at or about the time of the act, condition or event; and 
(b) The source of information from which made and the method and circum-
stances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under subsection (1) and 
the provisions conditions of subsection (2) have been met, there shaH fee is a pre-
sumption that the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction 
of the evidence is unnecessary. 
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41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions for driving under 
the influence or with a prohibited blood alcohol content — Weight. (1) In any 
action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person was driving 
or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
with a blood alcohol content of 40%- or greater statutorily prohibited, the results 
of a chemical test or tests as authorized in section 41-6-44.10 shall be admissible 
as evidence. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken within two hours of the alleged driving or 
actual physical control, the blood alcohol level of the person at the time of the 
alleged driving or actual physical control shall be presumed to be not less than 
the level of the alcohol determined to be in the blood by the chemical test. 
(3) If the chemical test w.as taken more than two hours after the alleged driving 
or actual physical control, the test result shall be admissible as evidence of the 
person's blood alcohol level at the time of the alleged driving or actual physical 
control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight shall be given to the 
result of the test. 
(4) The foregoing provisions of this section shall not be construed as limiting 
the consideration or application fey the trier of faet of the presumptions set forth 
i» section 41-6-44, «or sfeall they prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissi-
ble evidence as to a defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of the alleged driv-
ing or actual physical control. 
History: C 1953, 41-6-44 5, enacted by L. 
1979, ch 243, § 3, L 1983, ch. 99, § 15 
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys authorized to prosecute for driving while 
license suspended or revoked. Alleged violations of section 41-2-28, which consist 
of the person driving while his operator's or chauffeur's license is suspended or 
revoked for a violation of section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies with 
the requirements of section 41-6-43, section 41-6-44.10, section 76-5-207, or a crimi-
nal prohibition that the person was charged with violating as a result of a plea 
bargain after having been originally charged with violating one of more of those 
sections or ordinances, may be prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns as well 
as by prosecutors who are empowered elsewhere in this code to prosecute those 
alleged violations. 
History: C 1953, 41-6-44 8, enacted by L attorneys of cities and towns to prosecute 
1983, ch 102, § 1 those alleged violations 
This act enacts section 41-6-44 8, Utah 
Title of Act.
 C o d e Annotated 1953 - Laws 1983, ch 102 
An act i elating to prosecution of alleged 
violations of section 41-2-28, empowering city 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug — Refusal 
to allow — Warning, report, revocation of license — Court action on revoca-
tion — Person incapable of refusal — Results of test available — Who may 
give test — Evidence, fa) (1) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state 
shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, 
blood, or urine for the purpose of determining whether he was driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of 
alcohol and any drug as detailed in section 41-6-44, provided that s«eh so long as 
the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer having 
grounds to believe saefe that person to have been driving or in actual physical con-
trol of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, 
or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and 
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any drug as detailed in section 41-6-44. A peace officer shall determine which of 
the aforesaul tests shalTbe administered. 
No person; who has been requested pursuant to under this section to submit to 
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have the right to select 
the test or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to 
arrange for any specific test shall is not be a defense with regard to taking a test 
requested by a peace officer «er ancT it shall not be a defense in any criminal, civil 
or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the 
requested test or tests. 
(fe) (2) If stieh the person has been placed under arrest and has thereafter been 
requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests 
provided for in subsection (a) (1) of this section and refuses to submit to saeh the 
chemical test or tests, saeh the person shall be warned by a peace officer requesting 
the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation 
of his license to operate 4 motor vehicle. Following this warning, unless sseb the 
person immediately requests the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer 
be administered, no test shall be given and a peace officer shall submit a sworn 
report^ within five days after the date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe 
the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited or while under 
the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug as 
detailed in section 41-6-44 and that the person had refused to submit to a chemical 
test or tests as set forth in subsection (ft) (1) of this section. Within 20 days after 
receiving a sworn report from a peace officer to the effect that saeh the person 
has refused a chemical test or tests the department shall notify seeh the person 
of a hearing before the department. If at said that hearing the department deter-
mines that the person was granted the right to submit to a chemical test or tests 
and refused to submit to stieh the test or tests, or if st*eh the person fails to appear 
before the department as required in the notice, the department shall revoke for 
one year his license or permit to drive. The department shall also assess against 
the person, in addition to any fee imposed under subsection 41-2-8 (7), a fee of $25, 
which must be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover 
administrative costs, and which fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an 
unappealed court decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that 
the revocation was not proper. Any person whose license has been revoked by the 
department under the provisions of this section shall have the right to file a peti-
tion within 30 days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the district court 
in the county in which stieh the person shall reside resides. Such The court is 
hereby vested with jurisdiction, and it shall fee ito daty to set the matter for trial 
de novo upon 10-days' written notice to the department and thereupon to take testi-
mony and examine into the facts of the case and to determine whether the 
petitioner's license is subject to revocation under the provisions of this ttet chapter. 
(e) (3} Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering 
him incapable of refusal to submit to any such chemical test or tests shall be 
deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided for in subsection (a) (1) of 
this section, and the test or tests may be administered whether such person has 
been arrested or not. 
W (i l Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of such test 
or tests shall be made available to him. 
(e) (5} Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or person authorized 
under subsection 26-1-30 (19), acting at the request of a peace officer can withdraw 
blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content therein. This 
limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen. Any physi-
cian, registered nurse, practical nurse or person authorized under subsection 
26-1-30 (19) who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from 
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any person whom a peace officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of 
this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at which such sample is drawn, shall 
be immune from any civil or criminal liability arising therefrom, provided such 
test is administered according to standard medical practice. 
(f) (6) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of 
his own choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests admin-
istered at the direction of a peace officer. The failure or inability to obtain such 
additional test shall not affect admissability of the results of the test or tests taken 
at the direction of a peace officer, nor preclude nor delay the test or tests to be 
taken at the direction of a peace officer. Such additional test shall be subsequent 
to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
fe) ill For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test 
or tests, the person to be tested shall not have the right to consult an attorney 
nor shall such a person be permitted to have an attorney, physician or other person 
present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
(h) (8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests 
under the provisions of this section, evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any 
civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been com-
mitted while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any 
drug. 
History: C 1953, 41-6-44 10, enacted by L occupants Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982) 645 
1981, ch 126, § 43, L 1983, ch 99, § 16. P 2d 651. 
Actual physical control. Proceeding to revoke license for failure to 
To establish actual physical control of a submit to test. 
vehicle for purposes of this section, it is Driver's license revocation proceeding for 
unnecessary to show actual intent to control failure to submit to a requested chemical test 
the vehicle, intent to control a vehicle may be requires proof only by a preponderance of 
inferred from the performance of those acts the evidence Garcia v Schwendiman (1982) 
which constitute actual physical control. 645 P 2d 651 
Garcia v Schwendiman (1982) 645 P 2d 651. At a proceeding to revoke a driver's license 
There was an adequate showing that for failure to submit to a requested chemical 
motorist was in actual physical control of a test, department of public safety has the bur-
motor vehicle where motorist occupied the den to show arrested person was driving or 
driver's position behind the steering wheel of in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
a motor vehicle with possession of the igni- in addition to showing that the arresting 
tion key and with apparent ability to start officer had grounds to believe that the 
and move the vehicle, fact that vehicle was arrested person was under the influence, the 
blocked by a fence and another vehicle and same evidentiary burden must be met in a 
could be moved only a few feet did not pre- trial de novo in the district court Garcia v 
elude a finding of actual physical control Schwendiman (1982) 645 P 2d 651 
Garcia v Schwendiman (1982) 645 P 2d 651 
The "actual physical control" language of L a w Reviews. 
this section should be read as intending to Hansen v Owens — Expansion of the Priv-
prevent intoxicated drivers from entering ilege against Self-incrimination to Unknown 
their vehicles except as passengers or passive Limits, 1981 Utah L Rev 447 
41-6-44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by category I peace offi-
cers. The legislature finds that it is contrary to the safety of the public to leave 
vehicles unattended on public roads. 
(1) If a category I peace officer arrests or cites the driver of a vehicle for violat-
ing sections 41-6-43, 41-6-44, 41-6-44.2, or 41-6-44.10, the officer shall seize and 
impound the vehicle. ' 
(2) Any such officer who impounds a vehicle under this section shall remove, 
or cause the vehicle to be removed, to the nearest accessible state impound yard 
that meets the standards set by rule by the state department of motor vehicles, 
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